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1 
BRINGING THE BOSSES TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIALS: THE PROBLEMS WITH 
JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE 
AND THE “CONTROL OVER THE 
CRIME” APPROACH AS A 
BETTER ALTERNATIVE 
Dr. Juan-Pablo Pérez-León-Acevedo1* 
ABSTRACT 
Similar to most international and hybrid criminal tribunals, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
used the doctrine or theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) 
as a mode of liability when prosecuting and convicting those 
most responsible, namely, state and non-state political and 
military leaders, in cases of international crimes.  Against such 
background, the main research questions of this article are 
whether JCE should be applied in cases of those most 
responsible for international crimes and whether JCE should be 
replaced by the “control over the crime” approach.  Overall, this 
article argues and finds two main points.  First, JCE presents 
major issues when applied to cases involving senior leaders.  
Second, as done by the International Criminal Court, JCE 
                                                          
1 * Dr. Juan-Pablo Pérez-León-Acevedo is a researcher at PluriCourts: The 
Legitimacy of the International Judiciary (Research Council of Norway Project 
Number 223274), Faculty of Law, University of Oslo where he has also lectured 
in international law courses and supervises master’s degree theses. He holds 
a doctoral degree in social sciences (international law) (Åbo Akademi 
University, Finland); a LLM degree (Columbia University, USA); a 
professional title of lawyer and an LLB degree (Catholic University of Peru). 
E-mail: j.p.p.l.acevedo@jus.uio.no A part of this article was done during the 
author’s research stay at the Department of Criminal Law of the Max Planck 
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (Freiburg, Germany). He 
served in different capacities at the International Criminal Court, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, etc. The opinions 
expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the above-mentioned institutions. 
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should be replaced by the “control over the crime” approach since 
this approach is an overall more coherent alternative in the 
above-mentioned types of cases at international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals.  Compared to JCE, the “control over the 
crime” approach as applied to cases involving senior 
perpetrators of international crimes: i) allows a clearer 
differentiation between principals and accessories to the crimes; 
and, ii) in its manifestation as perpetration through another 
person using an organized structure of power, is more suitable 
to appropriately determine criminal liability of those most 
responsible in large criminal enterprises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) used the doctrine or theory of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability when prosecuting and 
condemning those most responsible, namely, state and non-state 
political and military leaders, for international crimes.2  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did the 
same. Hybrid criminal courts, such as the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),3 have followed the same path.  
However, JCE presents two major problems.  First, the 
distinction between principals and accessories to the crime is 
based upon the state of mind of the defendant rather than his or 
her acts.  The importance of the contribution of the accused 
person to the crime is hence undermined.  Second, there are 
important issues regarding individual culpability when JCE is 
applied.  On the one hand, the attribution of criminal liability to 
political and military leaders is complicated in a large JCE.  On 
the other hand, the attribution of crimes which were not part of 
the original criminal purpose and were committed by other JCE 
participants is highly controversial, in particular when it comes 
to special mens rea crimes. 
 
The above-mentioned problems matter for two reasons.  
First, a legal theory to distinguish those who are truly the most 
responsible for international crimes from those who have just 
accessorial participation is necessary.  In order to proceed with 
this distinction, the determination of criminal liability in 
international criminal courts and tribunals will suit the 
mandates of these judicial institutions, namely, to focus on 
senior leaders.  Second, in order to avoid impunity for senior 
                                                          
2  ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 191, 193 (2d. ed. 2008) 
(noting the specific cases in which the ICTY used JCE as a theory of 
prosecution).  
3  Id. at 330–31 (noting that hybrid courts are those which: i) have a mixed 
composition, i.e., not only international but are also composed of national 
judges of the country in which they are set up, such as in Sierra Leone or 
Cambodia; ii) have jurisdiction not only over international crimes but also over 
domestic offenses of the host country; and iii) were constituted by an agreement 
between a state and an international organization such as the United Nations).  
3
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leaders but in strict respect for the principle of individual 
culpability, the adoption of a more consistent approach to 
criminal liability is necessary. 
 
Against this background, the main research questions posed 
here are whether JCE should be used in cases of those most 
responsible for international crimes and whether JCE should be 
replaced by an alternative approach, such as the “control over 
the crime.”4  Thus, the present article examines some of the main 
problems with JCE in order to determine whether JCE should 
be used to prosecute top military and political leaders at 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals.  As will be 
examined, the “control over the crime” approach considers that 
principles to the crime are those who dominate the commission 
of the crime because they decide whether and how the crime will 
be committed.5  It is herein argued that the control over the 
crime approach constitutes a better alternative than JCE for two 
reasons.  First, this approach takes into consideration that the 
principals to the crime are not only those who physically carry 
out the crimes, but also those who control or mastermind the 
commission of the crimes, regardless of whether the senior 
leaders are structurally and/or geographically remote from the 
crime scene when the offence is committed, as they decide 
whether, when, and how those crimes are perpetrated.6  This is 
a “hybrid” approach that combines objective and subjective 
approaches.  Thus, it allows for a clear distinction between 
principals and accessories when prosecuting leaders for 
international crimes.  Second, “the control over the crime” 
approach—in its manifestation as perpetration through another 
person using an organized structure of power—seems to be 
legally and normatively more coherent when tracking down 
criminal liability to the senior leaders in large criminal 
enterprises and is applicable to any international crime.7  This 
                                                          
4  See infra Sections I.C, II.B, III.B (discussing what the “control over the 
crime” approach is and how “principals” to a crime are determined).  
5  See supra text accompanying note 4 (discussing what the “control over 
the crime” approach is and how “principals” to a crime are determined). 
6  See infra Section II.A (analyzing the distinction between principles and 
accessories in criminal liability).  
7  See infra Section III.A (noting the difficulties that come with using the 
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise and why the “control over the crime” 
approach is a better alternative).   
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1
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approach better embodies the notion that those higher up are 
guiltier, which accords with moral sense and political reality. 
 
Accordingly, the present paper has three main sections.  The 
first section provides the general framework—including 
terminological/conceptual aspects, the importance of an 
appropriate legal theory of criminal liability in cases of senior 
leaders, and a presentation of the problems with JCE in these 
cases.  The second section discusses aspects related to the 
distinction between principals and accessories in collective 
criminality.  This section analyzes issues to reach such 
differentiation when applying JCE and argues for “the control 
over the crime” approach as an alternative.  Lastly, the third 
section examines specific individual responsibility issues.  In 
particular, the limits of the application of JCE in certain 
scenarios, and conversely, the advantages of the “control over 
the crime” approach are examined. 
I. SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
The first subsection of this section discusses the terminology 
and the conceptual framework of those who commit 
international crimes.  Then the second subsection focuses on 
analyzing the importance of finding a mode or legal theory of 
criminal liability suitable to the goal of prosecuting and trying 
senior leaders.  Finally, the last subsection discusses why JCE 
is arguably problematic to achieve the goal of prosecution and 
trial of senior leaders. 
A. Who Commits International Crimes? 
A necessary starting point requires a determination of what 
“direct perpetrator” means in international criminal law.  Under 
this body of law, “direct perpetrator” is understood as an 
individual who physically carries out the objective elements of a 
crime with the mental state required by the crime in question.8  
                                                          
8  See generally CASSESE, supra note 2, at 188 (noting that whoever 
physically commits the crime is criminally liable); see generally HÉCTOR 
OLÁSOLO, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY 
LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 69 (Mohammed Ayat et al. 
eds., 2009) (stating that “[d]irect perpetration takes place when an individual 
physically carries out the objective elements of a crime . . . .”); see generally 
5
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This understanding may be criticized because the one who pulls 
the trigger would somehow be the direct, more direct, or real 
perpetrator.  Therefore, the attribution of criminal liability to 
those higher up becomes problematic.  Indeed, common law, in 
particular, American criminal law, does not refer to the category 
of “direct perpetrator.”  In common law, what is traditionally 
called accessory before the fact to a felony is: 
 
[O]ften the “man higher up” who is more of a social menace than 
the underlings he employs. There is no sound reason why he 
should not be called a “principal,” and treated as such for all 
purposes, just as he would be if the crime were treason or 
misdemeanor. The law in most jurisdictions is now to this effect. 
In almost all jurisdictions today persons who were accessories or 
principals at common law, except accessories after the fact, are 
now classified as principals. The legal distinctions between the 
classifications are today of little importance. However, the 
terminology has remained to describe the functions or activities of 
the actors rather than to distinguish legal culpability.9 
 
The difficulty to attribute criminal liability to senior leaders 
under the notion of “direct perpetrator” in international criminal 
law is arguably increased by the reluctance of international 
criminal law to incorporate conspiracy law.  Nevertheless, the 
meaning of “direct perpetrator” needs to be read in context.  In 
international criminal law, the “direct perpetrator” label, that 
may in principle be understood as the “real” perpetrator, is 
                                                          
Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 789 (Antonio Cassese et 
al. eds., 2002) (discussing solitary [direct] perpetration as well as the difference 
between ‘principals’ and ‘co-perpetrators’ of a crime); see generally Kai Ambos, 
Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 743, 748 (Otto Triffterer ed., 
2d ed. 2008) (discussing perpetration, co-perpetration and perpetration by 
means); see generally GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 119 (1st ed. 2005) (discussing how to define a “direct 
perpetrator” in the international law context).   
9  RONALD N. BOYCE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 505 (10th ed. 2007); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 664 
(4th ed. 2003) (noting that “[t]he distinctions between the other three 
categories [these three categories are: principal in the first degree, principal in 
the second degree and accessory before the fact, accessory after the fact is 
excluded], however, have now been largely abrogated, although some statutes 
resort to the common law terminology in defining the scope of complicity.”). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1
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actually only one denomination within the broader notion of 
“commission of the crime” which concerns criminal liability as a 
principal.10  “Direct” perpetration is thus only a form of 
“committing a crime.” 
 
“Committing a crime” is found in the Statutes of the ICTY,11 
the ICTR12 and the ICC13 and involves criminal responsibility as 
a principal.  Articles 7(1) and 6(1) of the Statutes of the ICTY 
and the ICTR, respectively, read as follows: “[a] person who . . . 
committed . . . a crime referred to . . . in the present Statute, 
shall be individually responsible for the crime.”14  When alleged 
that a senior leader, such as Slobodan Milošević, is a principal 
to the crime despite no involvement in the physical commission 
of the crime, the ICTY Prosecutor normally used the following 
language: “[b]y using the word committed in this indictment the 
Prosecutor does not intend to suggest that the accused 
physically committed any of the crimes charged personally.  
Committing in this indictment refers to participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise as co-perpetrator.”15  Thus, “committing” 
was not limited to physical perpetration of the crimes.16 
                                                          
10  See generally Eser, supra note 8, at 789–95 (noting the context in which 
“direct perpetrator” should be understood when determining criminal 
liability); see generally Ambos, supra note 8, at 748–55 (discussing 
perpetration, co-perpetration and perpetration by means); see generally 
OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 69–70 (discussing direct and indirect perpetration).  
11  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, May 25, 1993 
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
12  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
13  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 
I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
14  ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 7(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 12, 
art. 6(1). 
15  Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second 
Amended Indictment, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 28, 
2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/040727.pdf.   
16  Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. ICTY-05-87-PT, Decision 
on Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-Perpetration, ¶ 30 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/060322.htm (defining 
“committing” as follows: “that the accused participated, physically or otherwise 
directly or indirectly, in the material elements of the crime charged through 
positive acts or, based on a duty to act, omissions, whether individually or 
jointly with others.”) (alteration in original); see also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case 
7
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The notion of “direct,” “immediate,” or “physical” 
perpetrator appears under the wording “as an individual” in 
Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute: “[a] person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: (a) Commits 
such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person 
is criminally responsible.”17  This provision thus explicitly 
considers the “direct perpetrator” notion as a mode of 
“committing the crime,” namely, liability as a principal.  This 
same provision under “[c]ommits . . . through another person” 
also refers to an “indirect perpetrator.”18  A senior leader that 
“commits” a crime and becomes a perpetrator or principal 
thereof does not need to physically carry out the objective 
elements of the crime because it is sufficient that they are 
physically carried out by the person that the senior leader uses 
as a tool to execute the crime.19  In common law, this would 
correspond to cases where a perpetrator who is traditionally 
called “principal” in the first degree uses an innocent or 
irresponsible agent as an intermediary to commit a crime.20  
However, in international criminal law, this intermediary may 
also be a responsible agent.21 
 
The individual who orders the commission of crimes is 
generally considered a principal in international criminal law.22  
The ICC has however identified two meanings of “ordering” 
                                                          
No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 439 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
July 31, 2003) (providing an additional definition of “committing” in joint 
criminal enterprises).  
17  ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 25(3)(a). 
18  Id. 
19  Eser, supra note 8, at 793 (expressing that criminal liability extends to 
a person who commits a crime through another person); see infra Section III.B 
(discussing “direct” and “indirect” perpetrators in detail); see infra Section III.B 
(discussing the “The Control over the Crime” approach to address individual 
responsibility issues); see generally WERLE, supra note 8, at 123–24 (noting 
that committing a crime through another person is a sufficient basis for 
criminal liability under Article 23(3)(a) of the ICC Statute). 
20  LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 664. 
21  See infra Section III.B (discussing how Courts have held 
intermediaries liable for actions ordered by Principals). 
22  Eser, supra note 8, at 797; see generally Ambos, supra note 8, at 755 
(noting that a person who orders a crime is not an accomplice to the crime; 
instead, they are considered perpetrators). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1
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under its Statute.  The first meaning is “ordering” as a form of 
accessorial liability and is used to describe the act of a person in 
a position of authority and one who uses that position to convince 
another individual to commit an offence.23  The second meaning 
of “ordering” corresponds to the situation of a leader in command 
of an organization, who commits crimes “through another 
person” and incurs liability as a principal since “[t]he highest 
authority does not merely order the commission of a crime, but 
through his control over the organization, essentially decides 
whether and how the crime would be committed.”24 
 
Therefore, the expression “direct perpetrator” is understood 
here not as the sole “real” perpetrator, but just as the physical 
or immediate perpetrator.  References to senior leaders as 
“indirect” perpetrators—understood as mediate perpetrators—
do not undermine their level of responsibility as principals at all.  
This is connected to the scope of “the crime scene” in cases of 
international crimes such as concentration camps where senior 
leaders are not usually present.  This article precisely focuses on 
those perpetrators and not on low level or middle-ranking 
individuals. 
B. Why a Suitable Mode of Liability when Prosecuting the “Big 
Fish” Matters? 
International crimes prosecuted at international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals normally involve a large of number of 
perpetrators who range from senior state or non-state leaders, 
to low-echelon actors.  Due to their dimension, those crimes are 
usually committed collectively.  Nonetheless, their criminal 
repression has to be conducted on an individual basis in 
accordance with the principle of individual rather than collective 
liability and punishment, which is a basic principle of modern 
criminal law, regardless of how many perpetrators are 
                                                          
23  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, ¶ 517 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF; ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 
25(3)(b) (stating that a person who “[o]rders, solicits or induces the commission 
of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted” will be held criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment).  
24  Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 
518.  
9
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involved.25  The determination of the theory or mode of liability 
to be used constitutes one of the most important issues in trials 
of the most senior political or military leader, such as presidents, 
highest ranking military officers, and heads of non-state armed 
groups.26  The attribution of criminal liability to senior leaders 
is usually a difficult task due to evidentiary problems since these 
individuals are geographically remote from the crime scene and 
have no contact with the direct perpetrators. As a result, 
criminal liability approaches developed for common offences are 
not suitable.  This explains why international criminal law and, 
in particular, international and hybrid criminal tribunals have 
been so concerned to flesh out notions such as JCE or “control 
over the crime” to appropriately reflect the real dimension of the 
criminality of senior leaders in conformity with basic criminal 
law principles.  Unfortunately, these objectives have not always 
been fully met when applying JCE. 
 
At international and hybrid criminal tribunals, the selection 
and implementation of the most suitable legal theory also 
matters due to immediate practical consequences.  Since the 
constitutive instruments and/or prosecutorial policies of 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals are focused on 
offenders regarded as the most responsible or senior leaders,27 
                                                          
25  Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 93 (2005). 
26  See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 105 (2d ed. 2004) (referencing courts’ difficulty in ascertaining 
leaders’ guilt based on what may be circumstantial evidence when there may 
be a standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).  
27  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, 
Address at the Nuremberg Conference: “Building a Future on Peace and 
Justice”, (June 24, 25, 2007); However, at the ICTY, the Prosecutor’s initial 
strategy was “pyramidal,” i.e., the Prosecutor did first target lower level 
suspects, and then gradually moved on to go for the “big fish” including 
military commanders and senior political and military leaders.  Only later, the 
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence were amended so that the ICTY’s 
indictments would concentrate on: “one or more of the most senior leaders 
suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal.”  ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 28(A). Although the 
ICC Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain no similar provision, 
according to Moreno-Ocampo’s Address at the Nuremberg Conference, 2007, 
the ICC has focused on: “the worst perpetrators, responsible for the worst 
crimes, those bearing the greatest responsibility, the organizers, the planners, 
the commanders.”   
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1
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their resources need to be used efficiently to meet their 
mandates.  The selection of the most appropriate legal theory 
also matters in order to prevent that fairness, or perception of 
fairness, of the trials is compromised.  This is connected with the 
full respect for the right of the accused to a fair trial and due 
process guarantees, as well as coherence with basic principles of 
criminal law as contained in the legal instruments of 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals.28 
 
Ultimately, the use of a legal theory that distorts the role 
played by senior leaders may lead to a record that does not 
accurately capture why and how serious international crimes 
were committed.  Prosecutions and trials are arguably the most 
effective manners to separate collective guilt from individual 
guilt and contribute to the removal of the stigma of misdeeds 
from the innocent members of communities collectively blamed 
for crimes committed on other communities.29  Prosecutions and 
trials may also contribute to the truth and acknowledgment in 
fragile post-conflict societies.30  Although the judicial approach 
is not infallible, the judicial truth established as a result of a fair 
trial has a “tested” quality that makes it persuasive.31  
Therefore, the impact of selecting the most suitable mode of 
                                                          
28  ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 21; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 
20; Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, art. 17 
[hereinafter SCSL]; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea, NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004, c. 10, arts. 
33–35, 37, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf; see ICC Statute, 
supra note 13, arts. 64, 66–67 (discussing the rights of the accused). 
29  Lawrence Weschler, Inventing Peace, NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 1995, at 
64 (quoting Richard Goldstone, “[s]pecific individuals bear the major share of 
the responsibility, and it is they, not the group as a whole, who need to be held 
to account . . . so that the next time around no one will be able to claim that all 
Serbs did this, or all Croats or all Hutus . . . .”); Kenneth Roth, Introduction, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 15 (1995) (discussing how prosecutions 
lead to individuals taking responsibility for their perpetuation of violence so 
that their misconduct is not attributed to their people as a whole); see generally 
Juan Mendez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255, 277 (1997) 
(exploring arguments for prosecutions as an effective tool for isolating 
individual guilt from collective guilt).  
30  See Mendez, supra note 29, at 278 (discussing advantages of trials in 
ascertaining truth, asserting that trial verdicts are more difficult to challenge 
and that the truth is more persuasive because it is “tested”).  
31  Id. 
11
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liability goes beyond the legitimacy of international criminal law 
and international/hybrid criminal courts.  A factor influencing 
the findings of (international) criminal courts is the legal theory 
of criminal liability used.  Thus, the choice of one legal theory 
over another may have an impact, at least indirectly, both on the 
prevention of recurrence of the worst international crimes (often 
masterminded by top leaders), and on the perception of fairness 
of the trials of the most responsible. 
C. JCE in a (Fading) Spotlight 
Since the ICTY Appeals Chamber presided by Judge 
Shahabuddeen (Guyana) and integrated by Judges Cassese 
(Italy), Tieya (China), Nieto-Navia (Colombia), and Mwachande 
Mumba (Zambia) defined JCE in Tadic in 1999,32 both the ICTY 
and other international and hybrid criminal tribunals have used 
JCE, especially concerning cases of leaders.  The ICTY 
Prosecutor and Chambers thus relied on JCE in the 
determination of individual criminal responsibility in inter alia 
cases of Bosnian-Serb and Serb political leaders and high-
ranking military officers, including the case against former 
Serbian President Slobodan Milošević.33  ICTR cases involved 
political and military Hutu leaders.34  The Prosecutors and 
Chambers of the SCSL and the ECCC have also applied JCE to 
cases including Liberia’s former president Charles Taylor35 and 
senior Khmer Rouge leaders.36  Although the Iraqi High 
                                                          
32  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 178–234 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
33  Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended 
Indictment, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 28, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/040727.pdf. 
34  Id. 
35  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Urgent Defence Motion 
Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment 
Relating to the Pleading of JCE, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, ¶ 76 (Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, Feb. 27, 2009) (finding that the prosecution “adequately 
fulfilled the pleading requirements of the alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise in 
the Indictment”).   
36  See, e.g., Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 
Case 002/01 Judgment, ¶¶ 690–96 (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2014-08-
07%2017%3A04/E313_Trial%20Chamber%20Judgement%20Case%20002_01
_ENG.pdf (finding JCE I and JCE II applicable). 
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Tribunal was not strictly a hybrid criminal tribunal, it used JCE 
in the trial of Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders.37 
 
Conspiracy was once called by the American Judge Learned 
Hand, the “darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.”38  
Similarly, the JCE has been regarded as the “darling notion” by 
the Prosecution and, to a large extent, by the chambers of 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals.39  JCE occupied a 
central role as the most used mode of liability in the prosecution 
of high-ranking perpetrators at international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals.  This adoption of JCE should not in principle 
come as a surprise.  JCE presents important qualities to 
determine individual responsibility in mass criminality 
contexts.  Therefore, JCE links crimes to several offenders, 
namely principals and accessories, connecting them with 
distinct crimes.  This enables the understanding of the dynamics 
of interaction and cooperation in a criminal group or 
organization, which is ever-present in the commission of 
international crimes.40 
 
Nonetheless, JCE was defined in Prosecutor v. Tadic, which 
was a mob violence case involving low-level perpetrators who 
established a small criminal enterprise.  The accused, Dusko 
Tadic, joined the group whose intention was to evict Bosnian 
Muslims from their houses, but he had not personally inflicted 
fatal blows.41  In this case, JCE was used to sustain Tadic’s 
                                                          
37  See Ian M. Ralby, Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability in the Iraqi High 
Tribunal, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 281, 311, 313 (2010) (holding that the Iraq High 
Tribunal was modeled after the ICC and utilized JCE).   
38  Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).  But cf. Philip 
E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1140 
(1973) (noting that sometimes the use of conspiracy law can be a detriment to 
the prosecution because the “use of a conspiracy charge converts a relatively 
simple case into a monstrosity of conceptual complexity, giving the defense 
substantial grounds for an appeal.”). 
39  Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under 
the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 110 
(2007) (holding that JCE is relied on by international tribunals and by the 
Prosecution). 
40  Harmen van der Wilt, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Possibilities and 
Limitations, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 92 (2007).  
41  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, ¶ 373 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (finding that 
13
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conviction for the killings.  The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic 
concluded that the responsibility for crimes ensuing from group 
criminality would attach to all of the members of the group who 
shared the common purpose of the group to commit those crimes 
and actively further the group’s aims in some way.42 
 
However, when the ICTY from 2000 onwards43 decided to 
refocus its mandate from covering a wide range of perpetrators 
to only prosecuting those perpetrators considered as the most 
responsible, difficulties and challenges emerged.  The 
application of JCE to cases concerning senior political and 
military leaders in large criminal organizations faced two 
important obstacles.  First, JCE offered no consistent criterion 
to distinguish between principals and accessories in large 
criminal enterprises.  This lack of consistent criterion, by 
definition, is detrimental to the mandates of international and 
hybrid criminal tribunals.  It is detrimental because it is more 
difficult to analyze the scope of individual guilt of senior 
perpetrators understood in the collective dimension of 
international crimes.  Second, although the ICTY restricted the 
scope of JCE trying to avoid the undesired presence of collective 
                                                          
the accused “was a member of the group of armed men that entered the village 
of Jaski[c]i, searched it for men, seized them, beat them, and then departed 
with them and that after their departure the five dead men named in the 
Indictment were found lying in the village and that these acts were committed 
in the context of an armed conflict. However, this Trial Chamber cannot, on 
the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused 
had any part in the killing of the five men or any of them.”). 
42  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 196 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf (finding “[t]he 
objective and subjective prerequisites for imputing criminal responsibility to a 
participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have, effected the killing are as 
follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect of the 
common design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, 
or by providing material assistance to or facilitating the activities of his co-
perpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally affecting the killing, 
must nevertheless intend this result.”).  
43  See S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 5 (Mar. 26, 2004) (directing tribunals to focus on 
senior leaders when considering indictments under U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1503); see S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 1 (Aug. 28, 2003) (“Urging the ICTR to 
formalize a detailed strategy, modelled on the ICTY Completion Strategy, to 
transfer cases involving intermediate-and lower-rank accused to competent 
national jurisdictions . . . . “) (alteration in original). 
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responsibility,44 the case law of the ICTY shows that this 
restriction was insufficient.45  Moreover, due to the vague 
contours of a subjective approach, which is quintessential to 
JCE, the SCSL and the Iraqi High Tribunal applied JCE in such 
a broad manner that even supporters of JCE had misgivings.46 
 
Therefore, international and hybrid criminal courts should 
reconsider the use of JCE as the primary mode of criminal 
liability to prosecute high-level offenders.  The ICC Chambers 
have rejected JCE and replaced it with the “control over the 
crime” approach in the cases of state and non-state senior 
political and military actors, including Sudan’s President Omar 
Al Bashir.47 
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES IN 
COLLECTIVE CRIMINALITY 
The first subsection of this section aims to demonstrate that 
JCE contains a root problem: JCE provides an inconsistent 
approach to the distinction between principals and accessories 
to crimes when collective criminality is present, which is almost 
always present in international crimes.  Therefore, the 
qualification of senior leaders as principals may become blurred 
under JCE.  The second half of this section seeks to show that 
                                                          
44  See Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 344–
55 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf (analyzing the 
facts of the case, the court reasoned that “JCE is not an appropriate mode of 
liability to describe the individual criminal responsibility of the Accused, given 
the extraordinarily broad nature of this case, where the Prosecution seeks to 
include within a JCE a person as structurally remote from the commission of 
the crimes charged in the Indictment as the Accused.”).   
45  See infra Section III.A (criticizing the restriction as being insufficient 
to eliminating collective responsibility and treating all Accused individuals the 
same).  
46  See Ralby, supra note 38, at 329–30 (criticizing the broad usage of JCE 
as a misapplication of the tests required for JCE); see generally Wayne Jordash 
& Penelope Van Tuyl, Failure to Carry the Burden of Proof: How Joint 
Criminal Enterprise Lost its Way at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 8 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 591, 593 (2010) (criticizing broad usage of JCE as 
overreaching).   
47  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶¶ 7–8 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514.PDF (ordering Al Bashir arrested for 
crimes under the theory of control over crime).   
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the “control over the crime” approach is a better alternative since 
it leads to a consistent and clear identification of senior leaders 
as principals. 
A. Problems in Clearly Differentiating Principals from 
Accessories when Applying JCE 
According to Fletcher “[t]he central question in any system 
of complicity is distinguishing between co-perpetrators and 
accessories.  The former are punished as full perpetrators, 
regardless of the liability of anyone else.”48  Thus, to accurately 
establish the exact criminal liability of senior leaders, a sine qua 
non question, is to determine what approach to distinguish 
between principals and accessories to the crime is more suitable.  
There are three possible approaches as identified by ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v. Lubanga and ICC Trial 
Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Katanga.49 
 
First, under an objective approach to distinguish between 
principals and accessories, solely those who physically carry out 
the elements of a crime can be considered principals.50  This 
approach has not been used by international and hybrid criminal 
tribunals in high-profile cases because senior leaders are almost 
always remote from the crime scene.  Applying this approach 
would result in foot soldiers as the only principals whilst 
political and military leaders would be held as mere accessories 
to the crimes.  This would be a paradox considering the much 
more important role of the latter. 
 
The second approach is subjective because it considers the 
“state of mind in which the contribution to the crime was 
made”51 to differentiate principals from accessories to the crime.  
                                                          
48  GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 659 (2d. ed. 2002). 
49  Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant to Article 
74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 1390–94 (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-
01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 328–30 (Mar. 14, 
2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF. 
50  Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ¶ 1391. 
51  Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ¶ 921. 
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Therefore, it does not consider the level of contribution to the 
commission of a crime.  Under this approach, principals are only 
those who “make their contribution to the crime with the shared 
intent to commit the offence . . . regardless of the level of their 
contribution to its commission.”52  JCE is grounded in this 
approach.  As remarked by the ICTY, the situation of an 
individual as a principal to a crime lies in the shared intent by 
all the participants in the enterprise to make their contributions 
with the aim of furthering the common criminal purpose.53  The 
level of contribution of JCE participants is thus secondary.54 
 
By fleshing out this subjective approach, the ICTY in 
Prosecutor v. Tadic identified three variants of JCE.  The first 
category (JCE-I) corresponds to cases where all the co-accused 
act in pursuance of a common design and possess the same 
criminal intention.55  The second category (JCE-II) relates to the 
so-called “concentration camp” cases.  This category is similar to 
the first one, but it is applied to cases where the alleged offences 
have been committed by members of military or administrative 
units.56  In these two categories, the defendant must actually 
have the intent to commit the crime.57  The third category (JCE-
III) is also referred to as the “extended form” of JCE.58  JCE-III 
shares the same objective elements (actus reus) of the other two 
varieties of JCE: i) the presence of a plurality of persons; ii) the 
                                                          
52  Id. 
53  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 228 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion 
Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 20 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003), 
https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-05-
21%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jx
n%20Challenge.pdf.   
54  Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 227, 229. 
55  Id. ¶196. 
56  Id. ¶ 202. 
57  See id. ¶ 228 (discussing JCE-II, the accused’s personal knowledge of 
the system of ill-treatment must be additionally proved).   
58  See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 310 (2006) (noting the 
difference that first two categories focus on intent, but the third category 
describes an objective standard relating to the foreseeability of the 
consequences of the action).  
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existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to 
or involves the commission of a crime under the statute of the 
respective tribunal; and iii) the participation of the accused in 
the common design involving the perpetration of one or more 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the tribunal.59 
 
However, JCE-III differs from the other two types of JCE.  
It is different because, in addition to crime(s) agreed upon in the 
common plan, other crimes under JCE-III may be attributed if 
“(i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by 
one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly 
took that risk.”60  This foreseeability element, especially as to 
specific intent crimes, has made JCE-III highly controversial.61  
Via JCE-III, the ICTY indeed adopted mutatis mutandis, the so-
called Pinkerton doctrine from American conspiracy law.62  In 
Pinkerton v. United States, the US Supreme Court ratified the 
principle that co-conspirators are essentially accomplices to any 
crime actually committed by other persons involved in the 
conspiracy in furtherance of the common purpose of the 
agreement.63  However, Justice Jackson strongly objected the 
Pinkerton doctrine in Krulewitch v. United States at the US 
Supreme Court.64  The full application of the Pinkerton doctrine 
has been criticized as an “overly expansive application of 
liability”65 and the drafters of the US Model Penal Code have 
rejected it.66 
                                                          
59  Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 227.  
60  Id. ¶ 228 (alteration in original).  
61  See infra Section III.A (explaining the difficulties of prosecuting 
“foreseeable” crimes).  
62  Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S 640, 646–48 (1946).  
63  Id. at 645–47.  
64  Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445–51 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (stating that “a conviction of a substantive crime where there was 
no proof of participation in or knowledge of it, upon the novel and dubious 
theory that conspiracy is equivalent in law to aiding and abetting.”). 
65  BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 868 (Robert C. Clark et al., 2d ed. 2010).   
66  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985) (noting that “law would lose all 
sense of just proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each [co-
conspirator] were accountable for thousands of additional offenses of which he 
was completely unaware and which he did not influence at all.”); see also id. 
(stating that individuals may be held liable for all crimes that are a natural 
and foreseeable consequence of acting according to the common purpose, but 
natural and foreseeable is difficult to define). 
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There is some overlap between conspiracy and JCE.  The 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(IMT) extended conspiracy generally to all crimes under the 
jurisdiction of this Tribunal,67 besides its inclusion in Article 6(a) 
(conspiracy to commit crimes against peace).  However, the IMT 
only accepted conspiracy to commit crimes against peace as 
discussed later.68  The Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR only 
included conspiracy to commit genocide,69 following verbatim, 
the 1948 Genocide Convention (Article 3(b)).  Conspiracy was not 
included in the ICC Statute due to the insistence of civil law 
lawyers since conspiracy is generally not included in their 
criminal codes.70  However, liability for “contributing to a 
common purpose” (Article 25(3)(d)) was adopted as a surrogate 
for conspiracy.71  JCE may be considered another name for 
conspiracy due to their similarities.72  Nevertheless, JCE is a 
mode of liability to commit crimes, but it is not a crime in itself.  
This is different than conspiracy under common law as the US 
                                                          
67  See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6 Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 
280 [hereinafter Prosecution and Punishment] (stating that “[l]eaders, 
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes 
[crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity] are 
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”).   
68  See infra Section III.A (discussing whether the application of the 
doctrine of JCE can be extrapolated from small criminal enterprises to larger 
ones).  
69  See ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 4(3)(b) (discussing what 
constitutes a punishable act); see ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 2(3)(b) 
(discussing what constitutes a punishable act).  
70  See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES, 
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 189, 198–99 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (discussing the 
legislative history of general principles of criminal law in Part 3 of the Rome 
Statute and Article 21 on Applicable Law). 
71  WERLE, supra note 8, at 167; see Eser, supra note 8, at 802 (discussing 
the history of “conspiracy” and how the definition of the conspiracy has 
changed over time); see generally Ambos, supra note 8, at 760, 761 (discussing 
facilitation and contribution). 
72  See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 119 (2005) (discussing the 
formal distinction between JCE and conspiracy, and the weight such a 
distinction carries).  
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Supreme Court importantly identified in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.73  
However, conspiracy is a mode of criminal responsibility under 
the US Model Penal Code.74 
 
Furthermore, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović, which was integrated by a majority of common law 
judges,75 identified a difference between conspiracy and JCE: 
“while mere agreement is sufficient in the case of conspiracy, the 
liability of a member of a joint criminal enterprise will depend 
on the commission of criminal acts in furtherance of that 
enterprise.”76 
 
Even though under JCE senior leaders can be principals to 
the crime regardless of their remoteness from the crime scene, 
such as concentration camps, JCE distinguishes between 
principals and accessories to the crimes based exclusively on the 
will of the defendant.  In other words, minor contributions that 
may eventually include preparation of the actual commission of 
the crimes may be sufficient provided that the common criminal 
purpose is shared.77  Conversely, major contributions with 
knowledge of the common criminal purpose, but without 
necessarily sharing it, do not trigger criminal liability as a 
principal under JCE.  This was explicitly acknowledged by the 
ICTY as JCE provides with no formal distinction between JCE 
members “who make overwhelmingly large contributions and 
                                                          
73  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 n.40 (2006) (noting that “[the 
ICTY] has adopted a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ theory of liability, but that is a 
species of liability for the substantive offence . . . not a crime on its own.”).   
74  See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985) (describing inchoate 
crimes, including the definition of conspiracy); see also VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, 
supra note 65, at 866 (noting that “[t]he Model Penal Code treats conspiracy 
as a form of responsibility at § 5.03(1)”).  
75  Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on 
Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003), 
https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-05-
21%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jx
n%20Challenge.pdf (Presiding by Judge Shahabudeen (Guyana) and 
integrated by Judges Hunt (Australia), Gunawardana (Pakistan), Pocar 
(Italy), and Jorda (France)).   
76  Id. ¶ 23. 
77  Katrina Gustafson, The Requirements of an ‘Express Agreement’ for 
Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdjanin, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 134, 141 (2007). 
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JCE members whose contributions, though significant, are not 
as great.”78 
 
The above-analyzed point reveals a fundamental problem 
affecting JCE: its imposition of equal culpability to all members 
of the same JCE.  Whilst some ICTY judgments tried to 
incorporate the role and function of the accused in the criminal 
enterprise,79 the predominant tendency was to regard all 
participants as equals in regards to criminal liability 
attribution.80  This may even be associated to a unitary concept 
of perpetration, namely, no distinction between principals and 
accessories, which is still present in few domestic systems.81  The 
absence of a distinction between principals and accessories in 
the Charters of the IMT and the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East82 was due to the fact that these tribunals by 
definition truly focused only on the most responsible senior 
offenders.83  However, the distinction between principals and 
                                                          
78  Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 432 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403-e.pdf (noting that 
the Court does not differentiate based on the degree of contribution to the 
purpose of the crime). 
79  See Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 306, 
309–10, 312 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf (stating that to 
be held liable as a participant in a JCE, the extent of the participation must be 
“significant”); see Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 
97, 104 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e.pdf (overruling the 
Trial Chamber’s consideration about an additional requirement of 
significant/substantial contribution of a JCE participant and added that this 
may only be relevant to prove the mens rea of shared intent).  
80  See Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, ¶ 111 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/acjug/en/val-aj040225e.pdf (providing 
that participation in a JCE is regarded as a form of commission and all 
participants of the joint enterprise to be equally guilty regardless of the role 
they played). 
81  See Straffelov. Lov 126 of April 15, 1930. Consolidated text in 
Lovbekendtgorelse 1156 of Sept 20, 2018, Codice Penale art. 110 (It.).  
82  See Eser, supra note 8, at 784 (stating that the tribunal does not 
distinguish between principals and accessories). 
83   International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, art. 1, Jan. 
19, 1946 (stating “[t]he International Military Tribunal for the Far East is 
hereby established for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major 
war criminals in the Far East.”); see Prosecution and Punishment, supra note 
687, art. 1 (stating that “there shall be established an International Military 
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accessories has at the international level existed since Control 
Council Law No. 10,84 which was adopted by the Allied Control 
Council in Germany for the punishment of persons—other than 
the accused at the IMT—guilty of international crimes.85 
 
The special nature of international crimes leads to the need 
to distinguish between principals and accessories in order to 
identify the most responsible and to determine how and why 
they unleashed large scale violence.  Certain wording used by 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic caused some uncertainty 
concerning interpretation of JCE as a theory originating 
principal liability in conformity with customary international 
law.86  This corresponded to the fact that the ICTY, by 
interpreting the heading “committed” in Article 7(1) of its 
Statute (which is equivalent to Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute), 
concluded that: 
 
[I]t does not exclude those modes of participating in the 
commission of crimes which occur where several persons having a 
common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then carried 
out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of 
persons . . . . The notion of common design as a form of accomplice 
liability is firmly established in customary international law and 
in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly [in the ICTY Statute].87 
 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Milutinović in 
May 2003, clarified that JCE or the common purpose doctrine 
constitutes a theory of co-perpetration that gives rise to principal 
                                                          
Tribunal . . . for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis.”). 
84  Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace 
and Against Humanity, Control Council Law No. 10, art. II(2) (stating that 
“[a]ny person . . . is deemed to have committed a crime . . . if he was (a) 
principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime . . . .”). 
85  See id. (discussing the enactment of this statute in Germany as a 
means “to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 
and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 . . . .”).  
86  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 192–96 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
87  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 190, 220 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.  
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liability (as opposed to accessorial liability), and thus falls under 
the heading “committed” in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.88  
However, judgments of the ICTY Trial Chambers from 1999 to 
2003 were quite erratic.  Some judgments explicitly qualified 
JCE as a theory of accomplice liability, affirming that the 
distinction between principals and accessories was alien to the 
ICTY Statute.89  This may relate to the standard common law 
logics of principals and agents.90  Other judgments considered 
JCE as accessorial liability together with the notion of aiding 
and abetting,91 and as a form of accomplice liability not covered 
by the expression “committed” in Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute.92  Finally, other judgments of ICTY Trial Chambers 
were imprecise by determining that participants in a JCE can 
be either principals to a crime (co-perpetrators) or accessories to 
the crime (aiders or abettors) depending on their level of 
contribution,93 or the state of mind with which they contributed 
                                                          
88  Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on 
Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, ¶¶ 20, 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 
2003), https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-05-
21%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jx
n%20Challenge.pdf.   
89  See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 74–77 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krnojelac/tjug/en/krn-tj020315e.pdf (stating that 
the distinction between a “participant” and the “principal offender” is 
unnecessary and irrelevant for sentencing purposes). 
90  See BOYCE ET. AL., supra note 9, at 494–95, 505, 519–21 (outlining 
common law and Model Penal Code theories of liability); see LAFAVE, supra 
note 9, at 664 (discussing the differences between principals and 
accomplices/accessories); see also supra Section I.A (defining a “direct 
perpetrator”).  
91  See Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, ¶ 399 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf 
(comparing “the forms of responsibility based on participation in a common 
purpose with aiding and abetting . . . .”).   
92  See Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Motion by 
Momir Talic for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 40–45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 28, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/10328PR215226.htm (recognizing 
“common design” or “common purpose” as a “form of accomplice liability” that 
doesn’t align with the definition of ‘committed’ which is proposed to 
comprehend “physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself . . . .”).  
93  See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 642–43 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf (denoting that 
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to the crime.94  Moreover, the ICTY recognized that the 
introduction of a criterion of “special contribution” may lead to 
some disparities.95  The background problem is that no formal 
distinction exists between JCE members who make 
overwhelmingly large contributions to the criminal enterprise, 
and those whose contributions are less significant.96 
 
This uncertainty may also affect the accused.  The accused 
is already aware of the mode of liability charged with.  However, 
the accused might be adversely affected with a surprising 
sentence that arises out of this uncertainty if he/she is switched 
from an accessory in the charges to a principal in the conviction.  
Although JCE was not explicitly included in the Statutes of the 
ICTY and the ICTR, the status of JCE as part of customary 
international law—which is a legal source applied by these 
tribunals—holds importance relating to the principle of 
legality.97  Such principle goes to the heart of the defendant’s 
rights since it includes the nullum crime sine lege principle and 
the prohibition of non-retroactivity.98  Accordingly, some 
scholars cast doubts on how consistent JCE, as applied by the 
                                                          
“accomplice liability” is an ancillary form of participation compared to “direct 
or principal perpetrators”).  
94  See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 249, 
273 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf (concluding that 
actors making contributions knowing but not sharing the common criminal 
purpose are accessories).   
95  See Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 432 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403-e.pdf (holding that 
“[t]he Appeals Chamber recognizes that, in practice, this approach may lead to 
some disparities, in that it offers no formal distinction between JCE members 
who make overwhelmingly large contributions and JCE members whose 
contributions, though significant, are not as great.”).  
96  See id. (holding that there are disparities because “any [disparities are] 
adequately dealt with at the sentencing stage.”). 
97  See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant 
to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (stating “[i]n the view of the Secretary General, the 
application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the 
international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law 
that are beyond any doubt part of customary law . . . .”) (alteration in original). 
98  CASSESE, supra note 2, at 30–52 (holding that the nullum crime sine 
lege principal and the prohibition against nonretroactivity are important parts 
of international criminal law).   
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ICTY and the ICTR, is with the principle of legality.99  Despite 
these doubts, the ICTY considered that the question of JCE as 
part of customary international law and, in accordance with the 
principle of legality, had already been settled.100 
 
Therefore, JCE presents some important problems in 
clearly identifying senior leaders as principals to the crime to 
ensure they do not dilute or trivialize their liability.  Some 
scholars recognize this limitation and criticize JCE for that 
problem.101  However, they agree with some jurisprudence102 
that, as far as the difference between principals and accessories 
is introduced during sentencing via attenuating or aggravating 
circumstances, concerns as to the problem should not be 
excessive.103 
 
The problems associated with identifying senior leaders as 
principals to the crime to ensure they do not escape liability is 
criticized.  First, although judges may partially distinguish 
minor contributors (accessories) from principals at sentencing 
via mitigating and aggravating factors, criminal responsibility 
is not simply a function of sentencing.  This difference has to be 
reflected not only during the sentencing, but also in the 
indictment and trial, which holds importance for the legitimacy 
of international and hybrid criminal tribunals.  Individual 
criminal responsibility is not exclusively subsumed by serving 
an appropriate time in prison, but instead, it reaches the core of 
the criminal offence and leads to the stigma of having been 
                                                          
99  See, e.g., OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 52 (finding that “this conclusion is 
not necessarily consistent with those general principles on criminal 
responsibility laid down both in the ICTYS and in general international 
criminal law.”). 
100  Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 431 (explaining that JCE 
is customary international law); see Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, 
Judgement, ¶ 62 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf (finding that 
JCE is customary international law). 
101  Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 
5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 159, 167–72 (2007). 
102  See Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 432 (recognizing that 
although JCE leads to disparities between those accused who had a large 
impact and those that had a small impact, these disparities are “adequately 
dealt with at the sentencing stage.”).  
103  Ambos, supra note 101, at 173.  
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convicted as a principal.  The determination of the guilt of the 
accused is therefore a “central truth that the current version of 
joint criminal enterprise obscures.”104  Second, not all parts of a 
criminal organization are equal regardless of the difficulties to 
scrutinize its internal deliberative structure.  Leaders, mid-level 
perpetrators, and executioners perform different functions at 
different levels in the commission of international crimes.  
Hence, the attribution of equal criminal responsibility to 
offenders who did not have the same role is unacceptable due not 
only to legal, but moral considerations.105 
 
The problems with the application of JCE become clearer in 
the ICTY’s findings on the difference between JCE in cases of co-
perpetration (principals) and aiding and abetting (accessories).  
The ICTY repeatedly concluded that the support of the aider and 
abettor has to have “a substantial effect upon the perpetration 
of the crime.  By contrast, it is sufficient for a participant in a 
joint criminal enterprise to perform acts that in some way are 
directed to the furtherance of the common design.”106  The 
paradox here is that the level of contribution required for aiding 
and abetting (accessorial liability) is higher than for 
participating in a JCE (principal liability as a co-perpetrator).  
Such a distinction may be understood as JCE is grounded in a 
subjective approach to distinguish between principals and 
accessories and, hence, the distinction is based on the state of 
                                                          
104  Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69, 88 (2007) (discussing 
relative culpability of minor participants). 
105  See id. at 86–88 (discussing the problem of equal culpability). 
106  Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, ¶ 102 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/acjug/en/val-aj040225e.pdf; see also 
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub 
Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 20 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003), 
https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-05-
21%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jx
n%20Challenge.pdf (explaining that merely knowing about a JCE is not 
enough to be regarded as an aider and abettor); see also Prosecutor v. 
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 655, 662, 674, 694 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/acjug/en/090317.pdf (discussing the actus 
reus and its requirements, such as assisting, encouraging, and lending moral 
support). 
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mind under which the contribution to the crime was made. 
 
Accordingly, the lower level of contribution required by co-
perpetration founded in JCE is “compensated” by a higher 
threshold subjective element while only “knowledge” is required 
in aiding and abetting.107 Co-perpetration based on JCE requires 
aiming at the achievement of the common criminal plan or 
purpose, namely, dolus directus in the first degree.108  The 
unintended but improper consequence of the application of JCE 
is that central players in the commission of offences may be 
qualified simply as accessories and, in turn, those who have a 
minor role—such as foot soldiers—can be found guilty as the sole 
principals.  A related problem is that the ICTY rejected the 
possibility of finding an accused guilty because of aiding and 
abetting a JCE; although, in theory, this is feasible as an aider 
or abettor to a single crime within a JCE still holds such status 
unless that crime is totally unrelated to that JCE.109 
 
In any event, the combination of a stringent subjective 
element with a low level of contribution does not exist in JCE-
III because the ICTY ruled that criminal responsibility for a 
crime may be imposed on an actor even if “he only knew that the 
perpetration of such a crime was merely a possible 
                                                          
107  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 229(iv) (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement, ¶ 33(iv) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003), 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/00207024-
00207060.pdf.  
108   Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-
A, Judgement, ¶ 467 (Dec. 13, 2004); see OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 260 
(discussing the JCE requirements of co-perpetration); see Prosecutor v. 
Brđanin, In Trial Chamber II, Decision on Motion by Momir Talic for 
Provisional Release, ¶ 365 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 
28, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/10328PR215226.htm 
(discussing the foreseeability of a crime in the first degree).  
109  Ambos, supra note 101, at 169–70; see Prosecutor v. Kvočka Case No. 
IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 273 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e.pdf 
(discussing the liability to be incurred by the presence of a participant in a joint 
criminal enterprise); see generally DAVID ORMEROD & KARL LAIRD, SMITH AND 
HOGAN’S TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 264–65 (11th ed. 2005) 
(discussing the liability of an aider or abettor in relation to their efforts for the 
JCE).  
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consequence . . . .”110  This leads to another paradox whereby 
JCE-III leads to principal liability as opposed to aiding and 
abetting even though the objective and subjective elements of 
aiding and abetting are more demanding.  The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber tried to justify this by saying that in a JCE-III “the 
actor already possesses the intent to participate and further the 
common criminal purpose of a group.”111  Such explanation is 
unsatisfactory.  A person cannot be found responsible as a 
principal unless he/she holds the mens rea required by the 
respective crime; should one fall short of meeting the subjective 
elements of the crime contained in the respective crime 
definition, then he/she can eventually be considered as an 
accessory.112  Thus, JCE-III may, at least, and to an important 
extent, amount to a form of aiding and abetting despite the case 
law of the ICTY and the ICTR considered it as raising principal 
liability.113 
 
Overall, the identification of senior leaders as principals 
under JCE is problematic.  On the one hand, the ICTY 
sometimes considered JCE participants as mere accessories to 
the crimes; while on the other hand, JCE as a subjective 
approach may lead to finding a central player who substantially 
contributes to a crime as an accessory. 
B. The “Control over the Crime” Approach as an Alternative 
The “control over the crime” approach to distinguish 
principals and accessories was applied in Prosecutor v. Stakić by 
an ICTY Trial Chamber,114 which was constituted by civil law 
                                                          
110  Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, ¶ 33 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf. 
111  Id.  
112  See Ambos, supra note 101, at 168–71 (describing the elements 
required to be considered an aider and abettor, a co-perpetrator, or an 
accessory).  
113  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 192, 229 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf (explaining the 
differences between acting toward a common purpose and aiding and abetting); 
see also Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement, 
¶¶ 462–67 (noting the mens rea and extreme result of expanding the liability).  
114  Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, ¶ 440 (Int’l 
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judges.115  However, the trial judgment was overruled by the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, constituted by both civil law and 
common law Judges,116 which employed JCE instead.117  
Nevertheless, the “control over the crime” approach has been 
successfully applied at the ICC. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, which 
mainly consisted of civil law judges,118 considered in Prosecutor 
v. Lubanga that: 
 
[P]rincipals to a crime are not limited to those who physically carry 
out the objective elements of the offence. Rather, principals also 
include those individuals who, in spite of their absence from the 
scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because 
they decide whether and . . . how the offence will be committed.119 
 
The German scholar Claus Roxin developed the modern 
guise of this approach, which is an open concept and presents 
three main variants.120  First, the “control over the action” in 
direct or immediate perpetration, is such that an individual or a 
group of individuals physically commit(s) murder.121  This first 
variant is illustrated by criminal codes of civil law countries, 
such as Columbia.122  Under this first variant, the perpetrator is 
                                                          
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf. 
115  See id. (presiding by Judge Schomburg (Germany), Judge Vassylenko 
(Ukraine) and Judge Argibay (Argentina)).  
116  See id. (presiding by Judge Pocar (Italy) and integrated by Judge 
Shahabuddeen (Guyana), Judge Guney (Turkey), Judge Vaz (Senegal), and 
Judge Meron (United States)).  
117   Id. ¶¶ 59–63. 
118  See generally Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges (Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF (presiding by Judge Jorda (France) 
and integrated by Judge Kuenyehia (Ghana) and Judge Steiner (Brazil)).   
119  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment 
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 920 (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF.   
120  CLAUS ROXIN, Autoria y Dominio del Hecho en Derecho Penal 149 
(2000) § 17 [hereinafter Roxin 1]; see generally Claus Roxin, Crimes as Part of 
Organized Power Structures, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 193, 193–205 (2011) (noting 
that the concept of “perpetrator” is one that is more open-ended and varies 
depending on specific facts) [hereinafter Roxin 2].  
121  See generally Roxin 2, supra note 120, at 195–202 (discussing the 
murder in the context of “control over the action” through the Stashynsky 
case).  
122  Criminal Code of (1988), Section 25(2); see generally CÓDIGO PENAL [C. 
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a person who carries out the elements of the crime and has 
control over the crime, insofar as he/she physically carries those 
elements.123  This mode does not seem to be relevant for the 
attribution of criminal liability to senior leaders since they 
usually are neither the trigger-pullers, nor are they present at 
the crime scene. 
 
Second, the “control over the will” in indirect perpetration, 
e.g., when an individual uses an innocent agent (a minor or an 
insane) to commit murder, or when the physical (direct) 
perpetrator is coerced or mistaken.124  Criminal courts of both 
civil law and common law countries have applied this second 
variant.125  Such a variant may be of practical importance when 
the physical perpetrators are innocent agents, such as child 
soldiers who have been used in several recent armed conflicts,126 
or when there is enough evidence that the physical perpetrators 
were coerced. 
 
Third, an example of “functional control over the will” in 
indirect perpetration would be when a soldier who 
himself/herself is a perpetrator (neither under coercion, mistake, 
nor an innocent agent) commits murder by implementing orders 
within an organized structure of power controlled by a senior 
                                                          
PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 29, (Colom.) (discussing the differences between 
those who perform the criminal conduct and those who contribute to the 
criminal conduct). 
123  See Roxin 1, supra note 120, § 18 (discussing that the person who 
performs the necessary elements of a crime is the author of the crime); see also 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, ¶ 332 (Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF (discussing when a person can 
become a perpetrator of a crime); see also Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 488(a) (Sept. 30, 2008), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF (noting that “a 
principal is one who . . . physically carries out all elements of the offence . . . 
.”). 
124  Roxin 1, supra note 120, at 259–69; Roxin 2, supra note 120, at 197. 
125  See generally  OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 61–62 nn.271, 273–76 & 279 
(noting cases that have applied this approach). Courts of common-law 
countries have also applied the notion of the “control over the crime” to convict, 
as a perpetrator, the person who uses an innocent agent as a tool to commit a 
crime. 
126  Armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda, Colombia and Peru. 
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political or military leader, or a group of senior leaders (indirect 
perpetrators or masterminds).127  Courts of civil law countries 
have embraced this third variant in cases involving individuals 
such as former Latin-American Presidents.128  This variant has 
a broader scope of practical application than the second one.  In 
cases where there is one individual mastermind, who does not 
physically commit a crime, the individual can still be found 
liable for indirect commission because the individual uses a 
“direct” perpetrator as an “instrument” who is functionally 
controlled by the former’s dominant will.  The indirect 
perpetrator’s control over the crime is thus derived from the 
functional power of an individual’s dominant will.129  Where 
there is a plurality of masterminds, the functional control is 
based on the contribution of several offenders to the commission 
of a crime, which amounts to co-performance.  This is grounded 
in the principle of distribution of tasks.  The key position of each 
co-perpetrator lies on their shared control over the crime, hence, 
their power to ruin the implementation of the common plan by 
withholding his/her contribution to the crime.130 
 
                                                          
127  See Roxin 1, supra note 120, at 269–80 (discussing actors different 
involvements in criminal activity in organized power structures); see also 
Roxin 2, supra note 120, at 197–202 (discussing control based on organized 
power structures, the Eichmann case, and perpetration and participation with 
organizational power structure). 
128  See infra Section III.B (discussing specific cases involving “functional 
control over the will”). 
129  See Roxin 1, supra note 120, § 20 (discussing the possible justifications 
for actors who did not execute the act alone); see also  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 332(ii) 
(Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF 
(discussing that individuals control the will of those who carry out the objective 
elements of the offence through both direct and indirect perpetration); see also 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation 
of charges, ¶ 488(c) (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF (defining principal as a person who 
“has control over the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the 
offence  . . . .”). 
130  See Roxin 1, supra note 120, § 27 (discussing co-authorship and the 
dominion of fact); see also Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, ¶ 332(iii) (explaining that principals have control over 
the offense based on the essential tasks assigned to them); see also Katanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 488(b) 
(providing a definition of a principal perpetrator which considers the level of 
control the principal perpetrator had over the crime, measured by “the 
essential tasks assigned to him . . . .”). 
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Bearing in mind the previous doctrinal framework, it is 
argued here that the “control over the crime” approach is a 
sounder option than JCE to distinguish principals and 
accessories.  Thus, it more accurately captures the real 
dimensions of the criminal liability of political and military 
leaders based on three arguments. 
 
First, the “control over the crime” approach offers more 
coherent parameters to clearly qualify the most senior leaders 
as principals and not just as mere accessories to the crime.  It is 
argued here that the “control over the crime” is a more reliable 
approach.  Due to its hybrid nature, this approach merges the 
best of the subjective and objective approaches leading to a 
result legally and logically more consistent.  On the other hand, 
the objective component is given by the factual circumstances 
leading to the control over the crime, and the subjective 
component is represented by the awareness of the factual 
circumstances that lead to such control.131  In the light of the 
jurisprudence of the ICC, the “control over the crime” approach 
reconciles two contrary positions and makes them move 
forward.132  This clearly contrasts with JCE where, as 
analyzed,133 minor defendants may be found as the only 
principals and senior leaders may be convicted only as mere 
accessories.  Therefore, it can be argued that the “control over 
the crime” approach is more realistic than JCE because the 
former is better suited than the latter to reflect the dynamics of 
grave criminality as it happens in the real world.  In other words, 
it is considered here that it is fair and logical to hold senior 
leaders guilty as principals and not as mere accessories in cases 
where they were aware of the crime that they intentionally 
masterminded and kept under their control. 
 
                                                          
131  See OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 36 (analyzing the subjective and 
objective components of the control of the crime theory). 
132  See Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation 
of charges, ¶ 484 (citing Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil II § 25/30 
(2003), noting that “the doctrine of control over the crime corresponds to an 
evolution of subjective and objective approaches, such that it effectively 
represents a synthesis of previously opposed views and doubtless owes its 
broad acceptance to this reconciliation of contrary positions.”).   
133  See supra Section II.A (discussing potential issues that occur when 
differentiating principals from accessories). 
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Second, the “control over the crime” approach is a clearer 
standard to distinguish between principals and accessories.  
This is illustrated by how the ICC Statute frames the modes of 
liability.  Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute deals with the three 
basic modes of liability relating to commission by a principal “if 
that person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, 
jointly with another or through another person, regardless of 
whether that other person is criminally responsible.”  In turn, 
modes of accessorial liability are listed in subsequent 
paragraphs under the same article: ordering, soliciting and 
inducing (Article 25(3)(b)); aiding, abetting and otherwise 
assisting in the perpetration of the crime (Article 25(3)(c)); and 
a residual form of accessory liability (Article 25(3)(d)),134 which 
was cited by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic 
to give content to its then novel JCE.135  Accordingly, unlike the 
ICTY, which had to provide content to its Statute about how to 
distinguish between principals and accessories, the ICC Statute 
already contains a clear distinction between principals and 
accessories to the crime.  By relying on Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC 
Statute, ICC Trial Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Katanga and ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v. Lubanga concluded that 
the ICC Statute does not embrace the objective approach as the 
commission by another person cannot be reconciled with the 
consideration of physical perpetrators as the only possible 
principals to the crime.136 
 
Third, the ICC, based on its Statute, has also concluded that 
Article 25(3)(a) cannot be grounded in a subjective approach.137  
                                                          
134  See ICC Statute, supra note 13 art. 25(3)(d) (imposing responsibility 
where the offender “[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or 
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose.”). 
135  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 222 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
136  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant 
to Article 74 of the Statute ¶ 1392 (Trial Chamber II Mar. 7, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF; Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 
¶ 332(ii) (Pre-Trial Chamber I Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF. 
137  See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of 
charges, ¶¶ 333–37 (discussing individuals who have control over the 
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The ICC found that Article 25(3)(d) incorporates a mode of 
liability akin to JCE and, as under the ICC Statute this 
provision raises accessorial liability,138 the approach endorsed by 
the ICC Statute to identify the principals is not subjective unlike 
that adopted by the ICTY and the ICTR.139  Therefore, the ICC 
by interpreting its Statute has considered JCE or, in general, 
modes of liability based on a subjective approach as residual or 
accessorial.  By considering JCE as a theory under customary 
international law to distinguish principals from accessories, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic cited Article 
25(3)(d).140  However, as mentioned, ICC Pre-Trial Chambers in 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Prosecutor v. Katanga rejected the 
use of a subjective approach.  Some authors, based on a critical 
analysis of the ICTY’s jurisprudence, have casted doubts on both 
how coherent the use of JCE was to distinguish between 
principals and accessories and whether participation in a JCE 
gives rise to liability as a principal to the crime in the first 
place.141 
 
In any event, the real scope of criminal liability of political 
and military leaders is expected to be accurately and clearly 
portrayed by limiting it to one or more of the three modes of 
                                                          
commission of the offence as well as the subjective criteria for distinguishing 
between principals and accessories under Article 25(3)(a) and 25(3)(d) of the 
ICC Statute); The ICC also added that Article 25(3)(d) would have been the 
basis of the concept of co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute, 
had the drafters of the ICC Statute opted for a subjective approach to 
distinguish between principals and accessories.   
138  See id. ¶¶ 334–37 (discussing the close relation between Article 
25(3)(d) and the concept of joint criminal liability).  
139  See generally George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming 
Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 539, 549 (2005) (illustrating that although Article 25(3)(d) was 
considered akin to JCE by the ICC, there is actually an important difference 
because in the former, either intention to aim the criminal plan or even 
knowledge would suffice, whereas knowledge is not enough in JCE).  
140  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 222–23 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf (noting that 
Article 25 of the ICC Statute was not only adopted by a Diplomatic Conference 
in Rome but was also adopted by a majority of States, and was endorsed by the 
Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly). 
141  See OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 53–54 (discussing incongruent notions 
of international and regional conventions in differentiating principals and 
accessories). 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1
2019 BRINGING THE BOSSES TO INT’L CRIM. TRIALS 35 
principal criminal liability contained in the ICC Statute read in 
the light of the “control over the crime” approach.142  Indeed, the 
ICC has so far used those modes of liability concerning state and 
non-state civilian and military leaders, including warlords of 
Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan’s President 
Al Bashir.  As JCE is contained in the ICC Statute as a residual 
mode of liability, it will likely be used exceptionally.  The ICC 
primarily applied the “control over the crime” approach rather 
than JCE.143  Indeed, the ICC Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga confirmed that the “control over the crime” theory is “a 
convincing and adequate approach.”144  Among other legal 
scholars, Ambos has also concluded that “this theory is indeed 
now the guiding principle to distinguish between perpetration 
and accessorial responsibility (secondary participation) in the 
Court’s case law.”145 
III. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES 
The first subsection of this section aims to demonstrate that 
the application of JCE in cases of senior leaders may lead to 
inconsistencies with the principle of individual criminal liability.  
On the one hand, JCE presents limitations in large criminal 
enterprises.  While on the other hand, the attribution of crimes 
not originally agreed on in a JCE but supposedly “foreseeable” is 
highly controversial.  The second subsection seeks to 
demonstrate that the “control over the crime” approach does not 
present those problems.  In particular, the mode of indirect 
perpetration controlling an organized structure of power better 
reflects the liability of senior leaders in strict respect for the 
principle of individual criminal liability. 
 
                                                          
142  Briony McKenzie, The Principal Liability of Political and Military 
Leaders for International Crimes: Joint Criminal Enterprise versus Indirect 
Co-Perpetration 28–32 (Oct. 2014) (unpublished LLB (Hons) dissertation, 
University of Otago) (on file with University of Otago). 
143  See generally id. (discussing the application of the control over the 
crime approach in the context of the ICC). 
144  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgment on 
the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanaga Dyilo against his conviction, ¶¶ 469–70, 
473 (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09844.PDF. 
145  Ambos, supra note 8, at 979, 997–98.  
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A. Difficult Application of JCE to Large Criminal Enterprises 
and the Problem of “Foreseeable” Crimes 
Individual responsibility issues, a first problem that the 
original doctrine of JCE (as shaped by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. 
Tadic), face issues in their application when determining 
whether its application can be extrapolated from small criminal 
enterprises to large ones.  As mentioned, JCE was first framed 
at the ICTY to address individual criminal liability out of a mob 
violence case involving low-level perpetrators in pursuance of a 
small criminal enterprise.146  However, the real challenge came 
later when the ICTY started prosecuting and trying political and 
military leaders for specific crimes committed by a multitude of 
lower level offenders in a context of structural and geographical 
remoteness between the former and the latter.  The problem 
then became clear as voiced by the former ICTY/ICTR 
Prosecutor Del Ponte: “criminal liability of high ranking leaders 
who share the intent to commit a crime and jointly act to achieve 
it through various means, cannot be dependent on whether one 
of them actually physically commits the crime.”147 
 
In any event, the failure of JCE, as understood by the ICTY 
and the ICTR to live up to that challenge, may be explained by 
two complementary reasons.148  First, in systematic or large 
scale criminality, the higher the position of a military or political 
leader, the broader the criminal activities in which he/she has 
participated in are.149  As a result, the number of members of a 
JCE, in which the leader has supposedly been involved, often 
becomes much higher.150  Second, the theory of JCE requires 
including, within a JCE, political and military leaders as well as 
mid-level and low-ranking followers who physically execute the 
crimes.151  In scenarios characterized by large numbers of 
                                                          
146  See supra Section I.C (discussing specific courts that have applied the 
joint criminal enterprise theory). 
147  Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes 
at the International Level: The Experience of the ICTY, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
539, 550–51 (2006).   
148  See OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 189–90 (discussing difficulty in applying 
traditional JCE notions to perpetrators who are remote). 
149  Id. at 190. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
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individuals and remoteness, the application of the original 
notion of JCE becomes a sort of legal fiction that does not meet 
real circumstances.  JCE requires that all members of the 
criminal enterprise act in pursuance of a single common 
criminal plan.  They additionally need to share both the intent 
to commit the core crimes of the criminal enterprise and any 
additional intent (dolus specialis) that may be required by such 
crimes.  For example, this contrasts with the situation of the 
Nazi SS.  Although the IMT, after a fair hearing declared the SS 
to be a criminal organization, did not suggest that all of the SS 
members shared the same common purpose of the SS.152 
 
The common purpose doctrine assumes, as an element, that 
JCE members in entering a prior agreement prove to be 
psychologically capable and prepared to commit the crimes in 
question and, therefore, prevents them from “recoil and . . . have 
to blame themselves for their predicament.”153  The pivotal 
importance of a prior and explicit agreement is grounded in its 
condition as the only link that binds the members of the group 
together.  Nonetheless, in the contexts of large organizations 
that contain several hierarchical layers, these explicit 
agreements and mutual understandings are normally absent.  
Because of these absent explicit agreements, the use of JCE in 
charging high-ranking offenders is almost fatally compromised.  
Several authors, including Antonio Cassese, have stood up for 
JCE, concluding that the only solution in cases of vast criminal 
enterprises to attribute criminal responsibility to senior political 
and military leaders is simply not to rely on any JCE doctrine.154 
 
The application of JCE to large criminal enterprises seems 
to come dangerously closer to a variety of collective criminal 
liability155 and risks violating the principle of individual 
                                                          
152  IMT, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in 22 Trial of German Major War 
Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at 
Nuremberg, Germany 501–23 (1946) (declaring the Nazi Leadership Corps, 
Gestapo and SD, and SS to be criminal organizations but not doing so as for 
SA, Reich Cabinet, and the General Staff and High Command). 
153  van der Wilt, supra note 40, at 107. 
154  See Cassese, supra note 39, at 126, 133 (giving support to JCE).  
155  See Mohamed Elewa Badar, “Just Convict Everyone!”–Joint 
Perpetration: From Tadić to Stakić and Back Again, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 293, 
302 (2006) (finding that “[i]f, one day, the Prosecution succeeds in granting a 
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criminal responsibility.156  This theory is illustrated in 
Prosecutor v. Brđanin when the prosecution alleged a broad JCE 
spanning from the President of the Republika Srpska to 
members of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) and Serb 
paramilitary members.157  The ICTY Trial Chamber in 
Prosecutor v. Brđanin, which was later overruled by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber on this point, had found that JCE should only 
apply to relatively small-scale cases and not in this case due to 
its extraordinarily broad nature.158  This example, to some 
extent, is similar to the notion of considering membership in a 
criminal organization as being a crime, something not seen since 
the IMT Statute.159  Yet, when applying its Statute, the IMT 
recommended that future trials for criminal membership should 
                                                          
conviction for one of the ‘specific purpose crimes’ under the third category of 
joint criminal enterprise, this will alter the JCE doctrine to become an 
umbrella to ‘just convict everyone’.”); see Ambos, supra note 101, at 167–69 
(finding that JCE III makes a non-actor responsible for the conduct of an actor, 
which is a form of vicarious liability, and should only be considered as an aider 
or abettor to the crime). 
156  See CASSESE, supra note 2, at 33–34 (stating that the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility “lays down two notions. First, nobody may 
be held accountable for criminal offences perpetrated by other persons . . . . 
Secondly, a person may only be held criminally liable if he is somehow culpable 
for any breach of criminal rules.”).   
157  Alberto Nardelli et. al., Bosnia and Herzegovina: The World’s Most 
Complicated System of Government?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2014, 7:58 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-
elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government (showing that 
the Republika Srpska is one of two main political entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the other being the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina); see 
generally Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶ 10 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf (discussing the 
effects of the JCE on both the president and army members of the Republika 
Srpska).  
158  See Brđanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 355–56 (finding that the 
appeals chamber intended a small enterprise for JCE); see also Prosecutor v. 
Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 422 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the 
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403-e.pdf (noting that 
the Appeals Chamber contemplated applying JCE to larger criminal cases such 
as Tadic).  
159  See Prosecution and Punishment, supra note 67, art. 10 (stating that 
“where a group or organi[z]ation is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the 
competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring 
individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military or 
occupation courts . . . the criminal nature of the group or organi[z]ation is 
considered proved and shall not be questioned.”). 
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include firm due process guarantees and only involve true 
members of the convicted entities, namely: the SS, the SD and 
the Gestapo, and the leadership corps of the Nazi Party.160 
 
Although the ICTY and the ICTR kept their position of 
applying JCE to attribute criminal liability to high and middle 
ranking perpetrators, those tribunals were mindful of the 
problems just underlined.  The ICTY and the ICTR actually tried 
to adapt their original small criminal enterprise JCE theory to 
make it applicable to large criminal enterprises.161  In Prosecutor 
v. Brđanin, which followed the decision of the ICTR in 
Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor,162 the ICTY Appeals Chamber held 
that the application of JCE is not circumscribed to small cases.163  
This Chamber reached such a conclusion by considering that 
what matters in a basic form of JCE is not whether the person 
who physically carried out the objective elements of a specific 
crime is a JCE participant, but rather whether that crime 
belongs to the common criminal plan or purpose.164  The 
Chamber was presided by US Judge Meron,165 and in a 
conclusion similar to the Pinkerton Doctrine,166 the Court 
                                                          
160  See IMT, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in 22 The Trial of German 
Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal 
Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 449 (1948) (finding the need to safeguard 
convicting only certain individuals because of the possibility of a death 
sentence); see also Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and 
Conspiracy in International Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1094, 1161 (2009) (stating that as to the Nuremberg trials in the zonal 
governments that “the implication was that membership charges would not be 
a shortcut to conviction and would certainly not be available against average 
complicitous Germans, who would be handled through denazification or not at 
all.”).   
161  See Neha Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in Criminal Law, 
12 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 159, 162 (2011) (discussing the ICTY and ICTR adopting 
JCE). 
162  Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to 
the Crime of Genocide, ¶ 25 (Oct. 22, 2004), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/2004.10.22_Prosecutor_v_Rwa
makuba.pdf. 
163  Brđanin, IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 423.   
164  Id. ¶ 410. 
165  See generally id. (the Chamber was also integrated by Judges 
Shahabuddeen (Guyana), Gu ̈ney (Turkey), Vaz (Senegal), and Van Den 
Wyngaert (Belgium)). 
166  See supra Section II.A (discussing the application of liability as 
concluded in the Pinkerton Doctrine).   
39
40 PACE INT’L L. REV. Vol. 32:1 
established that: 
 
     In cases where the principal perpetrator shares that common 
criminal purpose of the JCE, or in other words, is a member of the 
JCE, and commits a crime in furtherance of the JCE, it is 
superfluous to require an additional agreement between that 
person and the accused to commit that particular crime. In cases 
where the person who carried out the actus reus of the crime is not 
a member of the JCE, the key issue remains that of ascertaining 
whether the crime in question forms part of the common criminal 
purpose. This is a matter of evidence.167 
 
By limiting the JCE participants to political and military 
leaders who design the common criminal plan and direct their 
subordinates to implement such plan, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber accordingly tried to address the problems stemming 
from the original JCE in cases of vast criminal enterprises 
committed in a broad territory over an extended period of time.  
Thus, all the JCE participants belong to political and military 
leadership and their relationship is more horizontal than 
vertical.  Some scholars have referred to this adaptation of the 
original JCE as “[JCE] at the leadership level.”168  Moreover, the 
ICTY in Prosecutor v. Martić implicitly endorsed this notion by 
even introducing some elements of indirect perpetration which, 
as explained, is grounded in the “control over the crime” 
approach: “[i]t is not required that the principal perpetrators of 
the crimes which are part of the common purpose be members of 
a JCE.  An accused or another member of a JCE may use the 
principal perpetrators to carry out the actus reus of a crime.”169 
 
Despite these efforts, it is argued here that such endeavors 
are not enough.  First, JCE as applied to leadership combines 
two competing approaches to distinguish between principals and 
accessories, namely, a subjective approach which is intrinsic to 
JCE, and a hybrid, or functional approach, that underlies the 
                                                          
167  Brđanin, IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 418.  
168  See OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 206 (discussing how rank and position 
determines your use and duties for the commission of crimes). 
169  Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶ 438 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf (alteration in original). 
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mode of indirect perpetration using an organized structure of 
power.  The result in this adapted JCE is that the controlling 
criterion to attribute criminal liability to senior leaders as 
principals is left uncertain.  Accordingly, the identification of the 
ultimate approach to determine criminal responsibility of senior 
leaders was left unclear.  Since JCE at the leadership level 
departs from the subjective approach, but without completely 
adopting the “control over the crime” approach, such an ultimate 
criterion may be the shared intent to implement the common 
criminal plan with the other high-ranking officers, that the 
defendant shares control over the crime with the other JCE 
leaders, or even both of them.  Such an outcome seems to just 
replace previous obscurity in applying the original JCE with 
other problems in applying an adapted JCE version at the 
leadership level. 
 
Second, the inconvenience of this exercise also stems from 
the contents of the case law invoked by the ICTY and the ICTR 
to shape the notion of co-perpetration based on JCE at the 
leadership level.  The jurisprudence invoked by the ICTY and 
the ICTR consisted in few post-World War II cases which applied 
forms of accessorial liability that have little to do with a doctrine 
relating to JCE/principal liability.  Due to a terminological 
confusion, the ICTR in Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor170 and the 
ICTY in Prosecutor v. Brđanin171 inaccurately concluded the 
existence of JCE at the leadership level based on the Justice case 
and the RuSHA case,172 both decided by the US Military 
Tribunal established in Germany after World War II.  In the 
Justice case, the US Military Tribunal concluded that the 
criminal liability of the defendant arises when, among others, 
the following conditions are met: “knowledge of an offense 
                                                          
170  Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to 
the Crime of Genocide, ¶¶ 15–25 (Oct. 22, 2004), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/2004.10.22_Prosecutor_v_Rwa
makuba.pdf. 
171  Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 395–404. 
172  IMT, Judgement of 3–4 December 1947 (ex. rel. Justice Case), in 3 
Trials of Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (1947) [hereinafter Justice Case]; 
IMT, Judgement 10 March 1948 (ex. rel.  RuSHA Case), in 5 Trials of Major 
War Criminals Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at 
Nuremberg, Germany (1948). 
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charged in the indictment and established by the evidence . . .” 
and “consciously participated in the plan or took a consenting 
part therein.”173  Despite the fact that there was some reference 
to plans or enterprises, the “knowledge” requirement used in the 
Justice case is a lower threshold than the one underlying JCE, 
namely, intent or dolus.174  Additionally, the conspiracy charge 
was dismissed in the Justice case as the US Military Tribunal 
decided to adopt a finding of the IMT, which consisted in that 
conspiracy only extended to conspiracy to commit crimes against 
peace but not to conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.175 
 
Another inaccuracy of the ICTR in Rwamakuba v. 
Prosecutor was to find that the language used in Article 6(a) of 
the IMT Charter is very similar to the language employed in 
Prosecutor v. Tadic.176  With regard to the language, neither the 
IMT Charter nor the IMTFE Charter were relatively close to co-
perpetration based on JCE.177  The Charters of the IMT and the 
IMTFE contain no distinction between principals and 
                                                          
173  Justice Case, supra note 172, at 1081, 1093.   
174  See generally id. at 1093–96 (discussing the knowledge requirement 
in the Justice case—a non JCE circumstance). 
175  IMT, Judgement of 1 October 1946 (ex. rel. Göering Case), in  Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal 
Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 226 (1947) (noting that “the Charter does not 
define as a separate crime any conspiracy except the one to commit acts of 
aggressive war.”); see also Bush, supra note 160, at 1164 (noting that “Control 
Council Law No. 10 contained different language about complicity, conspiracy, 
and accessorial liability, meaning that that there was a stronger argument 
that conspiracy liability, even for conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, was within Law No. 10.”). 
176  See Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision 
on the Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal 




GENOCIDE2.pdf (noting that “[t]he language used in the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, the indictment submitted to that tribunal, 
Control Council Law No. 10, and the indictment and judgement in the Justice 
Case have much in common with the language used in the Tadić Appeals 
Judgement to describe the elements of a joint criminal enterprise.”) (alteration 
in original); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement ¶¶ 
242, 260 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (discussing 
further the Control Council Law No. 10). 
177  Justice Case, supra note 172, at 1081, 1093. 
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accessories, and these instruments additionally distinguish up 
to four categories on participants in a common plan or 
conspiracy178 unlike JCE under which all the offenders are 
equally liable as principals (co-perpetrators) to the crimes.179 
 
The Iraqi High Tribunal, when applying JCE-II to large 
scale criminal enterprises, arguably erred in affirming that 
Saddam Hussein participated in a JCE to further the criminal 
objectives of the Iraqi government and had the necessary mens 
rea to be held guilty due to his title as the leader of the Iraqi 
regime.180  Thus, the Iraqi High Tribunal based its findings not 
on the defendant’s individual intent but on his position and even 
family relationships.181 
 
In addition to the problematic application of JCE to large 
scale criminal enterprises, another major issue on individual 
liability when applying JCE and, in particular JCE-III, is the 
problem of foreseeability of crimes not agreed upon by the JCE 
participants, either early or late-joiners.  This is especially 
controversial in cases of dolus specialis crimes such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity of persecution, and aggression.  Under 
JCE-III, all the members of a group are held accountable for the 
criminal conduct of some members merely because of the 
foreseeability of the crimes that are additional to the crimes 
originally agreed on.182  This explains why there is consensus to 
                                                          
178  See Prosecution and Punishment, supra note 67, art.6(c) (stating there 
“shall be individual responsibility” for the listed crimes); see also Charter of 
the Int’l Mil. Trib. for the Far East, sec. II, art. (5)(c) (listing “[l]eaders, 
organizers, instigators and accomplices . . . [as] responsible for all acts 
performed by any person in execution of such plan.”). 
179  See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement ¶¶ 
117–19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/fur-aj000721e.pdf (noting the 
previous Appeals Chamber decision that, “the common plan or purpose may 
materiali[z]e extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality 
of persons acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.”). 
180  Iraqi High Tribunal [First Criminal Court], 1/E First/2005 of 
November 5, 2006, p. 99 (Iraq).  
181  Id. 
182  See Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11A, Judgement, ¶¶ 83–84 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/acjug/en/mar-aj081008e.pdf (discussing the 
lowered mens rea requirement of the foreseeability standard in JCE III). 
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qualify such standard as neither precise nor reliable,183 and even 
regard JCE-III as the introduction of a form of strict liability.184  
The foreseeability standard paradoxically makes the sanction of 
the accused unforeseeable.  JCE-II thus presupposes that the 
participant in a JCE must know that the crimes in question 
normally take place in the respective enterprise.  However, this 
does not work in cases where the defendant credibly pleads a 
lack of knowledge with regard to foreseeability. 
 
It is argued here that the problems with foreseeability in 
JCE-III are that all members of the conspiracy need to be treated 
equally, the distinction among participants is destroyed, and 
JCE-III artificially forces a conviction that would instead have 
to be a conviction based on negligence.  This is illustrated in 
Prosecutor v. Krstic.  Krstic was a commander of the Republik 
Sprska Drina Corps.  The ICTY Trial Chamber concluded that 
“[Krstic] must be considered a principal perpetrator of these 
crimes.”185  In application of JCE-III for the genocide in 
Srebrenica.186  Nevertheless, the contacts and meetings of Krstic 
with higher officers of the Republik Sprska army such as 
General Mladic and the foreseeability of the Srebrenica 
massacre, which led to the conviction of Krstc under JCE-III, 
were considered insufficient by the Appeals Chamber that 
instead found Krstc as an aider and abettor.187  The imposition 
                                                          
183  See Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 139, at 550 (discussing the criminal 
prosecution of an individual based on a theory of liability not found in the 
Article 25 Rome Statute but found in case law of the ICTY Statute); see also 
Ambos, supra note 101, at 174 (describing that adding a knowledge element to 
the foreseeability element is not precise or reliable); see also van der Wilt, 
supra note 40, at 99 (noting the scope of the Joint Criminal Enterprises are 
unclear); see also Cassese, supra note 39, at 122 (arguing whether the mens 
rea requirement should be the “subjective foresight” or the “objective 
foreseeability”).   
184  GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC 
TRIBUNALS 292–93 (2005); E. VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 106–09, 
356–60 (2003).   
185  Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶ 644 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf. 
186  Id. ¶¶ 486–89 (noting that between July 12 and 15, 1995, members of 
the Bosnian Serb Army killed approximately 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and 
boys).  
187  Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 135–44 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004), 
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of a harsh sentence does not solve the problem because the 
difference between principal and accessories and the exact 
determination of criminal liability scope are at stake.188 
 
This situation becomes even more problematic when the 
foreseeability standard, imbedded in JCE-III, is expanded to 
dolus specialis crimes.  The ICTY Appeals Chamber in 
Prosecutor v. Brđanin downgraded the specific genocidal intent 
requirement,189 which quintessentially defines genocide, in 
order to circumvent notorious evidentiary problems.  This was 
followed by the ICTY decision in Prosecutor v. Milosevic.  In the 
latter case, an ICTY Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that a 
participant in a JCE III to commit genocide is not required to 
have the specific genocidal intent because it is sufficient that the 
commission of this crime was “reasonably foreseeable” to him.190  
Therefore, this Chamber distinguished between JCE-I and JCE-
III concerning the need of a specific intent shared by all the JCE 
participants in JCE-I as opposed to mere foreseeability for 
participants who were not directly perpetrating the genocide 
under JCE-III.  The main argument of the ICTY and the ICTR 
about the application of JCE-III to specific mens rea crimes 
corresponds to the nature of JCE as another mode of liability 
and not as a crime itself.191 
 
In principle, it may be claimed that one thing is the mens 
rea of a mode of liability (JCE-III) and another thing is the mens 
rea of the crime (genocide).192  However, there is some 
contradiction because an accused may not be held responsible 
                                                          
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf. 
188  See Ohlin, supra note 104, at 82–83 (discussing the concept of 
foreseeability in criminal law).   
189  Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 19, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/040319-2.htm. 
190  Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for 
Judgement of Acquittal, ¶¶ 291–92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
June 16, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm. 
191   Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 
5. 
192  See Elies van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to 
Convicting Individuals, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 184, 207 (2007) (discussing the 
advantages of developing indirect perpetration as a mode of criminal liability).   
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for committing a crime that requires special mens rea unless this 
can be proved regardless of what mode of liability is employed.  
Additionally, the distance between the mens rea of the offender 
who committed the specific intent crime and the mens rea of the 
other(s) cannot be too large because “the crucial notions of 
‘personal culpability’ and ‘causation’ would be torn to shreds.”193 
 
The ECCC has, however, excluded the application of JCE-
III from cases concerning genocide charges because, among 
other reasons, it considered JCE-III not to be part of customary 
international law at the moment of the Khmer Rouge crimes.194  
Nonetheless, the diffuse contours of the notion of “foreseeable” 
crimes led the SCSL to reach even more questionable results.  
The SCSL lowered the mens rea requirement for JCE 
membership since the SCSL Appeals Chamber considered it 
sufficient that JCE members share a lawful common objective 
and each one separately “contemplates” the possibility that 
crimes might be committed in pursuance of such objective.195  
This arguably constituted a violation of the principle of 
individual responsibility, and was even qualified as a 
nonexistent fourth form of JCE.196 
B. “The Control over the Crime” Approach as an Alternative 
Modes of liability grounded in the “control over the crime” 
approach, in particular indirect perpetration using an organized 
structure of power either applied alone or in combination with 
co-perpetration, constitutes a better option than JCE to address 
individual responsibility issues previously raised. 
 
                                                          
193  Cassese, supra note 39, at 122.  
194  Prosecutor v. Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), 
Decision on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (JCE), ¶¶ 77–83 (May 20, 2010). 
195  Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment ¶ 80 (Feb. 
22, 2008); see also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T, Decision on 
“Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions Regarding the Majority Decision 
Concerning the Pleading of JCE in the Second Amended Indictment”, ¶ 21 
(May 1, 2009) (discussing what Members of the Revolutionary United Front 
were being charged with and the requisite liability for the crimes). 
196  See Jordash & Van Tuyl, supra note 46, at 604 (discussing the notion 
of “common criminal purpose construction,” and how it has been applied 
inaccurately in some cases).  
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Indirect perpetration, namely, perpetration through 
another person, uses an organized structure of power and 
exhibits a solid theoretical structure to capture criminal liability 
of high-level perpetrators in contexts of the commission of large 
scale and/or systematic international crimes.197  The hallmark of 
this mode is the perpetrator’s domination of the human “tool” 
who directly executes the crime.198  Nevertheless, this necessary 
lack of autonomy of the direct perpetrator would result in that 
only non-criminally responsible actors such as a minor, an 
insane individual, or a person under duress can be direct 
perpetrators, which would make this theory unsuitable for 
international crimes because these are almost always 
perpetrated by criminally responsible direct offenders.199  To 
address this point, the theory of the German Professor Roxin, 
which was elaborated with a view to the trial of Eichmann,200 is 
of particular importance.  Roxin introduced a consistent 
exception via the notion of the organized structure of power that 
guarantees the “domination” of the commission of the crime even 
when the direct perpetrator is criminally responsible, which is 
incorporated in Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute.  Indirect 
perpetration using an organized structure of power is applicable 
provided that two requirements are met: there is a tight 
hierarchical structure, and the members of the organization 
must be easily replaceable.201 
 
When closer attention is paid to the dynamics underlying 
mass criminality, it could be that crimes masterminded by the 
“perpetrator behind the perpetrator” or “the man behind the 
man” almost always involve a complex apparatus of power at 
which normally the direct perpetrators are “fungible”, namely, 
any foot soldier unwilling or unable to carry out the crime can 
almost be immediately replaced by another one and so forth.  
                                                          
197  See Jain, supra note 161, at 184–85 (discussing the elements of a 
perpetrator’s control over the organization). 
198  Roxin 1, supra note 120, at 269–80. 
199  See Thomas Weigend, Perpetration Through an Organization: The 
Unexpected Career of a German Legal Concept, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 96 
(2011) (discussing the actions of indirect perpetration, including the 
perpetrator’s “domination of the human ‘instrument’ . . . .”).   
200  Roxin 1, supra note 120, at 273.  
201  Id. at 272–73; see also Roxin 2, supra note 120, at 199–201 (noting that 
there are two components of indirect perpetration). 
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Therefore, the will of the indirect perpetrator, normally senior 
leaders, will be guaranteed and implemented precisely due to 
the use of an organized structure.  As to the Nazi structure of 
power, used by Roxin as an example, some historians and 
specialists in holocaust studies such as Raul Hilberg have 
concluded that the German bureaucracy, especially during the 
last stages of the holocaust, worked without being ordered or 
pressured as everybody knew what to do and the objectives.202 
 
Be that as it may, indirect perpetration using an organized 
apparatus of power made its debut at an international criminal 
tribunal in Prosecutor v. Katanga when the ICC found that the 
“control over the crime” amounted to “control over the 
organi[z]ation.”203  The ICC determined that the requirements of 
indirect perpetration now includes the existence of an apparatus 
of power, within which the direct perpetrator and indirect 
perpetrator operate and which, in turn, enables the indirect 
perpetrator to secure the commission of the crimes.204  By 
quoting Roxin, the ICC established that: 
 
While his power of control over his own actions is unquestionable, 
the [direct] perpetrator is nonetheless, at the same time, a mere 
gear in the wheel of the machinery of power who can be replaced 
at any time, and this dual perspective places the intellectual 
author alongside the perpetrator at the heart of events.205 
 
Also, ICC Trial Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Katanga 
referred to and explained in detail the theory of “control over the 
organi[z]ation” (Organisationsherrschaft), in which the 
“perpetrator behind the perpetrator” liability is applicable as a 
theory to interpret Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute: 
                                                          
202  See Christopher R. Browning, Spanning a Career: Three Editions of 
Raul Hilberg’s Destruction of the European Jews, in 8 LESSON AND LEGACIES 
191, 194 (Doris L. Bergen ed., 2008) (noting that “Hilberg asserts that this 
bureaucracy ‘had no master plan, no fundamental blueprint, no clear-cut view 
of its actions.’ Yet . . .  the German administration knew what it was doing.”).   
203  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, ¶ 500 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF.   
204  Id. ¶¶ 515–18.  
205  Id. ¶ 515 (quoting Claus Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft 245 
(8th ed. 2006)).   
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This theory is the work of Claus Roxin and appears to be invoked 
mostly in scenarios where a crime was committed through persons 
bearing criminal responsibility . . . . [T]he theory is consonant with 
the foregoing constituent elements of indirect commission, since 
exertion of control over an apparatus of power allows control over 
the crimes committed by its members; a perpetrator behind the 
perpetrator may, therefore, be at work . . . . [T]he Pre-Trial 
Chamber held that where a crime is committed by members of an 
“organi[z]ed and hierarchical apparatus of power”, “[t]he highest 
authority does not merely order the commission of a crime, but 
through his control over the organi[z]ation, essentially decides 
whether and how the crime would be committed.” 
. . . .  This key feature of the organi[z]ation, discerned in such 
functional automatism, secures the superior’s control over the 
crime, irrespective of the members’ identity.206 
 
As ICC Trial Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Katanga 
recognized, the apparatus of power autonomously works and its 
existence and survival cannot depend on any personal 
relationship between its members since the existence of a “power 
structure” (Matchapparat) is necessary.207  Importantly, the 
Chamber concluded that Roxin’s theory cannot be reduced 
exclusively to bureaucracies similar to those of the Third 
Reich.208  Therefore, a senior leader that commits a crime and 
becomes a perpetrator or a principal does not need to physically 
carry out the objective elements of that crime because it is 
sufficient that these elements are physically carried out by a 
person who the senior leader uses as a tool to execute the 
crime.209  An additional example of the ICC’s practice can be seen 
in the arrest warrant against the Sudanese President Al Bashir 
which stated that indirect perpetration was present using an 
organized structure of power and thus establishing liability.210 
                                                          
206  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant 
to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 1404–05, 1409 (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF.  
207  Id. ¶ 1409. 
208  Id.  
209  Eser, supra note 8, at 709. 
210  See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on 
the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶¶ 209–23 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF (finding that Al Bashir is alleged to 
be “criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute for committing 
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In addition, indirect perpetration using an organized 
structure of power is flexible enough to be combined to better 
reflect the reality of criminality at large scale.  For example, in 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, the ICC employed jointly indirect 
perpetration using an organized structure of power and co-
perpetration giving way to “indirect co-perpetration”211 as the 
only feasible manner to accurately depict the real scope of the 
criminal liability of the two defendants as principals.  The ICC 
used this combination since even though Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui acted with a common plan (co-perpetration), each co-
defendant led his own organization, and some of the individuals 
within each structure of power only accepted orders from the 
leader of their own ethnic group who could be described as: 
 
An individual who has no control over the person through whom 
the crime would be committed cannot be said to commit the crime 
by means of that other person. However, if he acts jointly with 
another individual—one who controls the person used as an 
instrument—these crimes can be attributed to him on the basis of 
mutual attribution.212 
 
Other factual scenarios may be better examined via the so-
called “joint indirect-perpetratorship.”213  Unlike “indirect co-
perpetration”, which involves more than one criminal 
organization, joint indirect perpetration involves “only one 
(criminal) organization led and dominated by (various) co-
                                                          
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes through the ‘apparatus’ of 
the State of Sudan . . . .”). 
211  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, ¶ 490 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF; see OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 302–
30 (describing how indirect co-perpetration has developed in cases including 
the Katanga case); see also Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, 
Decision on Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-
Perpetration, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/060322.htm (finding that “in 
order to come within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, any form of responsibility 
‘must be provided for in the Statute, explicitly or implicitly’, and ‘must have 
existed under customary international law at the relevant time.’”).  
212  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, ¶ 493. 
213  See Ambos, supra note 8, at 997–98 (discussing the applicability of 
assessing a scenario under a joint indirect-perpetration theory). 
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perpetrators acting with a common purpose.”214  In the practice 
of the ICC, the Ivorian politician leader Blé Goudé was charged 
with the perpetration of the alleged crimes jointly with both the 
former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and Gbagbo’s inner 
circle.215  This means that Goude was accused of having 
“exercised control, jointly with the other co-perpetrators, over 
the pro-Gbagbo forces, which were organi[z]ed and hierarchical 
in nature and through which the crimes charged were 
committed.”216 
 
At the domestic level, the Junta Trial case in Argentina and 
the German Border case illustrate this type of situation related 
to “joint indirect-perpetratorship.”  In the Junta Trial case, the 
Federal Court of Appeals of Argentina found that members of 
the military dictatorship known as “Junta,” who ruled Argentina 
from 1976 to 1984, controlled and commanded a machinery of 
power whereby members of armed and security forces tortured, 
murdered, and disappeared civilians who were considered 
subversives.217  In the German Border case, the German Federal 
Supreme Court found the leaders of the German Democratic 
Republic responsible for homicide as indirect perpetrators by 
using an organized structure of power that involved border 
guards who shot citizens that tried to flee to West Germany.218  
The application of indirect perpetration using an organized 
power structure controlled by several individuals has also been 
used in the prosecution of senior leaders of non-state armed 
groups.  For example, the Peruvian Supreme Court in Abimael 
Guzman found the leaders of the Maoist Shining Path 
Movement-Peruvian Communist Party to be guilty as indirect 
perpetrators of widespread and systematic murders and 
                                                          
214  Id. at 998. 
215  Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé, Case No. ICC-02/11-02/11, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé, ¶ 137 (Dec. 11, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_05444.PDF. 
216  Id. ¶ 149; see also Ambos, supra note 8, at 998 (discussing further the 
elements of a joint indirect-perpetratorship theory).  
217  Cámara Federal de Apelaciones [CFed.] [federal court of appeals], 
09/12/1985, “Prosecutor v. Jorge Rafael Videla,” (1985) (Arg.). 
218  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 3, 1992, 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN BGHSt 39, 1 
(Ger.) translated in Raymond Youngs, Sourcebook on German Law 
(Cavendish, 1994).  
51
52 PACE INT’L L. REV. Vol. 32:1 
terrorist acts committed during the Peruvian armed conflict.219 
 
Although ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v. Al-
Bashir implied that there were indirect co-perpetrators,220 this 
may be questioned.221  In any event, the Chamber in Prosecutor 
v. Al-Bashir employed indirect perpetration using a structure of 
power as a mode of attribution of criminal liability.  This makes 
sense because there was only one criminal organization led by 
Al-Bashir who was a standalone figure in full control of the 
alleged structure of power organized to supposedly commit 
crimes in Darfur.222  This approach was also employed by the 
Peruvian Supreme Court in the 2009 judgment in the case 
against former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori.223  
Fujimori was convicted of acts categorized as crimes against 
humanity due to his role as an indirect perpetrator controlling 
an organized structure of power that involved the use of a 
paramilitary group that murdered and tortured civilians 
considered subversives or terrorists.224  In 1998, Justice Baltazar 
Garzón (National Audience of Spain) invoked similar reasoning 
by issuing a committal for trial decision against the ex-Chilean 
President Augusto Pinochet, who ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990; 
Pinochet allegedly controlled an apparatus of power to commit 
systematic and widespread torture, murder, and enforced 
disappearance of political and ideological opponents.225 
                                                          
219  Att’y Gen. v. Guzman, R.N. No. 5385-2006, Judgment, § 4.5.8–5.2 
(Crim. Chamber II of the Sup. Ct. Nov. 26, 2007), 
https://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/Peru/GuzmanRe
inoso_CorteSuprema_Sentencia_13-10-2006.pdf.  
220  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 216 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF.  
221  Ambos, supra note 8, at 998. 
222  Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 
222.  
223  Att’y Gen. v. Fujimori, Exp. No. A.V. 19-2001Barrios Altos, Case No. 
AV 19-2001, Judgement, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement 
Cases, ¶¶ 718–48 (Sup. Ct. of Peru Apr. 7, 2009), 
https://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/Peru/Fujimori_S
entencia_7-4-2009.pdf translated in Aimee Sullivan, The Judgement Against 
Fujimori for Human Rights Violations, 25 Am. U. L. Rev. 834, 834-42 (2010). 
224  Id. 
225  Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. Div’l Ct. 1998); R 
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Accordingly, indirect perpetration grounded in the “control 
over the crime” approach is sufficiently flexible to accurately 
capture the criminal liability of leaders.  As discussed, possible 
scenarios include: i) cases of a single senior leader; ii) cases 
where there are several senior leaders acting as co-perpetrators 
but each one controlling his/her own structure of power; and iii) 
cases in which the structure of power of one criminal 
organization is jointly controlled by two or more high-ranking 
perpetrators. 
 
The combination of indirect perpetration using an organized 
structure of power and co-perpetration is flexible and coherent 
as the modes of liability employed follow the same approach, 
namely, “control over the crime” unlike attempts by the ICTY to 
complement JCE with some elements from the “control over the 
crime” approach.  This proved to be unconvincing as it merged 
two competing approaches.  As analyzed, the “control over the 
crime” approach thus applied portrays the complex dynamics in 
large criminal enterprises both at a horizontal level (co-
perpetration) and at a vertical hierarchical level (indirect 
perpetration).  The reality of modern bureaucracies, which 
engage in mass criminality and rely on the functional division of 
labor, is therefore appropriately reflected.226 
 
Third, indirect perpetration either applied alone or in 
combination better guarantees the respect for the principles of 
legality and individual criminal responsibility.  Some case law 
of the ICTY invoked the vague concept of “substantial” 
contribution in order to decrease the uncertainty related to the 
subjective approach employed by the ICTY.227  Conversely, the 
                                                          
v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 
3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L. 1998) annulled by R v. Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2), 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L. 
1999); R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte, 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999); see also Michael Byers, The Law and Politics 
of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE  J. COMP. & INT’L L. 415, 416–23 (2000) 
(discussing Pinochet’s accusations in Spain and background of legal 
proceedings).  
226  See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 98 (1989) 
(noting when the means are dissociated from the moral ends of using violence).   
227  See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 95–
97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf (discussing the 
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ICC has applied a higher threshold because one of the objective 
elements of co-perpetration based on joint control over the crime 
is that the contribution to the crime be “essential.”228  Under 
Article 30 of the ICC Statute, the subjective element of the 
crimes requires the intent to commit the crime and relevant 
knowledge.  This high threshold guarantees the afore-mentioned 
principle, which holds importance since the commission of a 
crime as a principal entails the highest degree of individual 
criminal responsibility and must be construed narrowly.229  
Concerning criminal responsibility of senior leaders, modes of 
liability grounded in the “control over the crime” approach 
presupposes a sort of “(normative) control over the acts imputed 
to them and a mental state linking them to these acts, thereby 
complying with the principle of culpability.”230 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Overall, “the control over the crime” as reflected in the 
practice and law of the ICC is a better approach than a subjective 
approach underlying JCE.  Nevertheless, as Fletcher has noted, 
this is neither the beginning nor the end of the story.231  Certain 
concerns may be raised about how a theory originally framed for 
a very rigid state apparatus with a high level of hierarchical 
control (Nazi Germany) can work in contexts such as non-
international armed conflicts in Africa with non-state actors 
where such “mechanization” seems to be weaker and the 
structures of power are more informal.  However, the ICC has 
been aware of those limitations and has applied the indirect co-
perpetration in those contexts.232  Concerning some obstacles 
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related to evidence of the requirement of “interchangeability” of 
direct perpetrators in the African context, the ICC suggested 
that an alternative means to secure automatic compliance with 
the orders of the leaders may be through “intensive, strict, and 
violent training regimes.  For example, by abducting minors and 
subjecting them to punishing training regimes in which they are 
taught to shoot, pillage, rape, and kill . . . .”233  Another concern 
is the vagueness of the “domination” notion and whether this is 
a factual or a normative concept.234 
 
Be that as it may, the “control over the crime” approach 
should be used by future international and hybrid criminal 
tribunals when trying the most responsible, namely, senior 
leaders, in contexts of large-scale crimes.  In conclusion, this 
approach, and in particular the indirect perpetration controlling 
an organized structure of power, is more advanced than JCE.  
This conclusion is formulated despite the fact that the said 
approach has some imperfections that judicial institutions such 
as the ICC must correct as much as possible.  This is important 
because there is a need to adopt a more consistent legal 
approach.  Even more importantly, this is necessary because 
there is a need to accurately reflect the real dimensions of the 
roles of the highest level offenders as principals in scenarios of 
massive commission of the worst international crimes, and in 
strict respect for the rights of the accused, the principle of 
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